{"id":12652,"date":"2009-05-06T15:12:48","date_gmt":"2009-05-06T15:12:48","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2009\/05\/06\/the-consequence-argument-against-compatibilism\/"},"modified":"2009-05-06T15:12:48","modified_gmt":"2009-05-06T15:12:48","slug":"the-consequence-argument-against-compatibilism","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2009\/05\/06\/the-consequence-argument-against-compatibilism\/","title":{"rendered":"The Consequence Argument Against Compatibilism"},"content":{"rendered":"

Is the will free or determined? This is a crude way of posing the traditional problem of free will and determinism. But the traditional problem presupposes that free will and determinism are incompatible. Since this cannot be legitimately presupposed, the fundamental problem is the compatibility problem: Are free will and determinism compatible or incompatible? <\/font><\/p>\n

I view them as incompatible, and, influenced by Kant, I see compatibilism as a 'shabby evasion' of the underlying difficulty. But since one cannot shame<\/em> a philosophical position out of existence, pace<\/em> Daniel Dennett, I had better present an argument. An argument one finds in the literature is the Consequence Argument. (See for example Peter van Inwagen's An Essay on Free Will<\/strong>.) Here is a version of it that draws upon van Inwagen and also <\/font>this discussion<\/font><\/a> by Tomis Kapitan.<\/font><\/p>\n

\n

<\/p>\n

<\/font><\/p>\n

0. We first of all need to understand what determinism is. It is the doctrine that the past determines<\/em> a unique present and future. That is, past states of the universe in conjunction with the laws of nature render only one present state of the universe physically or nomologically possible. The laws of nature might have been otherwise: they are not metaphysically (broadly logically) necessary. And the past might have been otherwise. But given the actual past, and the actual laws, the actual present state of the universe could not have been otherwise. Things have to be the way they are given<\/em> that things were the way they were and the laws are what they are. As the word 'given' indicates, the necessity here is conditional rather than absolute. There is no logical or metaphysical necessity that I be blogging now — please don't confuse determinism with fatalism — but if determinism is true, then my blogging now is physically necessary. Therefore,
<\/font><\/p>\n

1. If determinism is true, then all our actions and thoughts are consequences of events and laws of nature in the remote past before we were born.
<\/font><\/p>\n

2. We have no control over circumstances that existed in the remote past before we were born, nor do we have any control over the laws of nature.
<\/font><\/p>\n

3. If A causes B, and we have no control over A, and A is sufficient for B, then we have no control over B.
<\/font><\/p>\n

Therefore
<\/font><\/p>\n

4. If determinism is true, then we have no control over our own actions and thoughts.
<\/font><\/p>\n

Therefore, assuming that responsibility requires control,
<\/font><\/p>\n

5. If determinism is true, then we are not responsible for anything we do or think.
<\/font><\/p>\n

Therefore, assuming that freedom entails responsibility,<\/font><\/p>\n

6. If determinism is true, then we are not free, which is to say that every form of compatibilism is false.<\/font><\/p>\n

If you don't accept this argument, which premise will you reject?<\/font><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Is the will free or determined? This is a crude way of posing the traditional problem of free will and determinism. But the traditional problem presupposes that free will and determinism are incompatible. Since this cannot be legitimately presupposed, the fundamental problem is the compatibility problem: Are free will and determinism compatible or incompatible? I … Continue reading “The Consequence Argument Against Compatibilism”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[301],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-12652","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-free-will"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/12652","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=12652"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/12652\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=12652"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=12652"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=12652"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}