{"id":12608,"date":"2009-05-29T19:19:27","date_gmt":"2009-05-29T19:19:27","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2009\/05\/29\/an-objection-against-frankfurtstyle-examples-peter-lupu\/"},"modified":"2009-05-29T19:19:27","modified_gmt":"2009-05-29T19:19:27","slug":"an-objection-against-frankfurtstyle-examples-peter-lupu","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2009\/05\/29\/an-objection-against-frankfurtstyle-examples-peter-lupu\/","title":{"rendered":"An Objection Against Frankfurt-Style Examples (Peter Lupu)"},"content":{"rendered":"

 <\/font>(Comments in blue by BV.)<\/span><\/font><\/p>\n

1) Frankfurt-style examples are intended to be counterexamples to PAP.<\/font><\/p>\n

PAP: A person S is morally responsible for intentionally doing X at t only if S can intentionally refrain from doing X at t.<\/font><\/p>\n

BV: The following formulation better captures what Frankfurt actually says in his 1969 J. Phil.<\/em> article, namely, "a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise."<\/font><\/span><\/p>\n

PAP*:  A person S is morally responsible for intentionally doing X at t only if (i) S intentionally does X at time t, and (ii) S could have intentionally refrained from doing X at t.<\/font><\/span><\/p>\n

Assumption: I assume that intentionally refraining from doing X is identical to intentionally doing some Y, where Y is not identical to X. <\/font><\/p>\n

BV: Do you need this assumption? The assumption appears false.   If I refrain from doing one thing, it doesn't follow that I do some other thing:  I could do nothing at all.  If I refrain from smoking a cigarette during the next ten minutes, it does not follow that I do something else during that period.  I take it that not-doing-X is not an action.  It is an action-omission.  If 'X' and 'Y' range over action-types, <\/span>then not-doing-X is not identical to doing-some-Y.<\/span><\/p>\n

2) A Frankfurt-style example is going to be a genuine counterexample to PAP just in case it entails the antecedent of PAP as well as the negation of its consequent: i.e.,<\/p>\n

(I) S is morally responsible for doing X at t;
(II) It is not the case that S can intentionally refrain from doing X at t.<\/font><\/p>\n

BV: Note that (II') <\/span>corresponding to PAP* is<\/font><\/span><\/p>\n

(II') Either it is not the case that S intentionally does X at t, or it is not the case that S could have intentionally refrained from doing X at t.<\/font><\/span><\/p>\n

3) The following are two claims I shall prove:<\/font><\/p>\n

Claim 1: Any Frankfurt-style example that is interpreted to entail (I) and (II) is inconsistent: i.e., it also entails the negation of either (I) or (II). <\/font><\/p>\n

Claim 2: Any Frankfurt-style example that is interpreted as entailing (II*) instead of (II) is consistent but is not a counterexample to PAP. <\/font><\/p>\n

(II*) It is not the case that S can behave in a manner other than X at t.<\/font><\/p>\n

But, (II*) is not the negation of the consequent of PAP. Hence, (I) and (II*) do not refute PAP. Therefore, standard Frankfurt-style examples are either inconsistent or they are not genuine counterexamples to PAP.<\/font><\/p>\n

4) Suppose a Frankfurt-style example (choose your favorite example) entails (I) and (II).
4.1) Then such an example includes a backup mechanism that is capable of directly causing S to do X at t in the event S intentionally refrains from doing X at t. But the very existence of such a backup mechanism entails <\/font><\/p>\n

(III) S can intentionally refrain from doing X at t.<\/font><\/p>\n

Because if (III) were false and S could not intentionally refrain from doing X at t, then there would be no need for a backup mechanism.
4.2) (II) and (III) are contradictories.
4.3) Therefore, the assumption stated in (4) must be false.
4.4) This proves Claim 1 above.<\/font><\/p>\n

BV:  I agree that (II) and (III) are contradictories.  But (II') and (III) are not contradictories.  So even if you succeed in refuting your PAP, you haven't refuted Frankfurt's PAP*.  If I haven't blundered, it seems that the debate now shifts to what exactly the Principle of Alternate Possibilities is.
<\/span>
5) Suppose that a Frankfurt-style example entails (I) and (II*).
5.1) As before, such an example entails (III) as well. But, now, notice that as long as we maintain a sharp distinction between behavior and action, (II*) and (III) are perfectly consistent.
5.3) Therefore, the supposition stated in (5) does not lead to a contradiction. Frankfurt-style examples that entail (I), (II*), and (III) are perfectly consistent.
5.4) But notice that none of these propositions; i.e., (I), (II*), and (III) contradict the consequent of PAP. Therefore, consistent Frankfurt-style examples are not counterexamples to PAP. This proves Claim 2.<\/font><\/p>\n

6) Since this holds for any arbitrary Frankfurt-style example, we can state the following:<\/font><\/p>\n

(*) Every Frankfurt-style example is either inconsistent or it is not a counterexamples to PAP.<\/p>\n

7) The only potentially vulnerable move that I can see in this argument is the claim that the existence of a backup mechanism entails (III): S can intentionally refrain from doing X at t.
7.1) But, how can the proponents of Frankfurt-style examples deny such an entailment? The very point of Frankfurt-style examples is that the existence of such a backup mechanism (however it is described) is feasible and that its sole purpose is to insure that in the event S intentionally refrains from doing X at t, then the backup mechanism induces S to do X at t. Thus, the rationale of such a backup mechanism presupposes that S can intentionally refrain from doing X at t; but this just is (III). Hence, any Frankfurt-style example entails (III). <\/font><\/p>\n

<\/font><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

 (Comments in blue by BV.) 1) Frankfurt-style examples are intended to be counterexamples to PAP. PAP: A person S is morally responsible for intentionally doing X at t only if S can intentionally refrain from doing X at t. BV: The following formulation better captures what Frankfurt actually says in his 1969 J. Phil. article, … Continue reading “An Objection Against Frankfurt-Style Examples (Peter Lupu)”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[301],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-12608","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-free-will"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/12608","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=12608"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/12608\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=12608"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=12608"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=12608"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}