{"id":11730,"date":"2010-03-31T14:57:25","date_gmt":"2010-03-31T14:57:25","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2010\/03\/31\/the-aporetics-of-truthmaking\/"},"modified":"2010-03-31T14:57:25","modified_gmt":"2010-03-31T14:57:25","slug":"the-aporetics-of-truthmaking","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2010\/03\/31\/the-aporetics-of-truthmaking\/","title":{"rendered":"Could a Concrete Individual be a Truthmaker?"},"content":{"rendered":"

Could a concrete individual such as the man Peter function as a truthmaker?  Peter Lupu and I both find this idea highly counterintuitive.  And yet many contemporary writers on truth and truthmaking have no problem with it.  They have no problem with the notion that essential predications about x are made true by x itself, for any x.  Assume that the primary truthbearers are Fregean propositions and consider the Fregean proposition *Peter is human.*  (Asterisks around a declarative sentence form a name of the Fregean proposition expressed by the sentence.)  Being human is an essential property of Peter: it is a property he has in every possible world in which he exists.  It follows that there is no world in which Peter exists and *Peter is human* is not true.  Hence Peter himself logically suffices for the truth of *Peter is human.*  Similarly for every essential  predication involving our man.  Why then balk at the notion that a concrete individual can serve as a truthmaker?<\/font><\/p>\n

Here is an argument in support of balking:<\/font><\/p>\n

1. Every asymmetric relation is irreflexive.<\/em>  (Provable within first-order predicate logic.  Exercise for the reader: prove it!)<\/font><\/p>\n

2. Truthmaking is an asymmetric relation.<\/em>  If  T makes true *p*, then  *p* does not make true T. <\/font><\/p>\n

3. Truthmaking is irreflexive.<\/em> (From 1, 2)<\/font><\/p>\n

4. Whatever makes true a proposition admitting of existential generalization also makes true the proposition which is its existential  generalization.<\/em>  For example, if Peter makes true *Peter is human,* then Peter makes true the existential generalization *There are humans.* And if *Peter is human* makes true **Peter is human* is a proposition,* then *Peter is human* makes true *There are propositions.*  (It is a universally accepted axiom of truthmaking that one and the same truthmaker can make true more than one truthbearer. Truthmaking is not a one-to-one relation.)<\/font><\/p>\n

5.  If a concrete individual, by itself and in virtue of its mere existence, can make a true an essential predication about it, then an entity of any ontological category can, by itself and in virtue of its mere existence, make true an essential predication about it<\/strong>.<\/em>  And conversely.  For example, if Peter makes true *Peter is human,* then *Peter is human* makes true **Peter is human* is a proposition* and also **Peter is human* is an abstract object,* etc.  And conversely: if *Peter is human* makes true **Peter is human* is a proposition,* then Peter makes true *Peter is human.*<\/font><\/p>\n

6. *There are propositions* is essentially a proposition. <\/em><\/font><\/p>\n

7. A concrete individual, by itself and in virtue of its mere existence, can make true an essential predication about it.<\/em><\/font><\/p>\n

8. *There are propositions* is made true by *Peter is human* and indeed by any proposition, including *There are propositions.*<\/em>   (From 4, 5, 6, 7.  To spell it out:  Peter makes true *Peter is human* by 7; *Peter is human* makes true **Peter is human* is a proposition* by 5 and 6.  *There are propositions* is the existential generalization of **Peter is human* is a proposition.* *Peter is human* makes true *There are propositions* by 4.  *Peter is human,*, however, can be replaced by any proposition in this reasoning.  Therefore, *There are propositions* is made true by any proposition including  *There are propositions.*<\/font><\/p>\n

9. *There are propositions*<\/em> has itself as one of its truthmakers. (From 8)<\/font><\/p>\n

10. It is not the case that truthmaking is irreflexive. <\/em> (From 9.  Note that when we say of a relation that it has a property such as symmetry or irreflexivity, we mean that that has this property essentially.)<\/font><\/p>\n

11. (10) contradicts (3).<\/em><\/font><\/p>\n

12. One of the premises is false.<\/em> (From 11)<\/font><\/p>\n

13. The only premises that are even remotely controvertible are (2) and (7).<\/em>  <\/font><\/p>\n

14. (2), which affirms the asymmetry of truthmaking, cannot be reasonably denied.<\/em>  Why not?  Well, the whole point of truthmaking is to provide a metohysical, not empirical, explanation of the truth of truthbearers.  Explanation, however, is asymmetric by its very nature: if x explains y, then y does not explain x.  <\/font><\/p>\n

15. (7) is false: it it not the case that a concrete individual, by itself, can serve as a truthmaker.<\/em> <\/font><\/p>\n

Credit where credit is due:  The above is my attempt to put into a rigorous form some remarks of Marian David which point up the tension between the asymmetry of truthmaking and the notion that concrete individuals, by themselves, can serve as the truthmakers for essential predications about them.  See his essay "Truth-making and Correspondence" in Truth and Truth-Making<\/em>, eds. Lowe and Rami. McGill 2009, 137-157, esp. 152-154.<\/p>\n

<\/font><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Could a concrete individual such as the man Peter function as a truthmaker?  Peter Lupu and I both find this idea highly counterintuitive.  And yet many contemporary writers on truth and truthmaking have no problem with it.  They have no problem with the notion that essential predications about x are made true by x itself, for … Continue reading “Could a Concrete Individual be a Truthmaker?”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[224,237,228],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-11730","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-explanation","category-facts","category-truth"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/11730","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=11730"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/11730\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=11730"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=11730"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=11730"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}