Alan Rhoda e-mails:<\/font><\/p>\n In a recent post<\/a> you write:<\/span><\/span> Thanks, Alan. Let's rehearse the dialectic. I argued in a standard self-referential way that *There are truths* is not just true, but necessarily true. (For *There are no truths,* if true is false, and if false is false, hence is necessarily false, so its negation is necessarily true.) I then asked whether the necessity of its truth is unconditional or rests on a condition such as the existence of thinking beings. (In other words: is the necessity of truth merely a transcendental presupposition without which we cannot operate as thinking beings, or is the necessity of there being truths metaphysically grounded in rerum natura<\/em>?) If the existence of truths is merely a transcendental presupposition, then it would seem that the following scenario is possible: there are no thinking beings and no truths either. If this scenario is possible, then the necessity of *There are truths* would be conditional. I then tried to show that the scenario is not possible by invoking the principle Necessarily, for any p<\/em>, p –> it is true that p.<\/em> My thought was that if it is possible that there be no thinking beings and no truths either, then it is true<\/em> that this is possible. But if it is true that this is possible, then it is true independently of what anyone thinks. But then truth as something more than a transcendental presupposition is being presupposed.<\/font><\/p>\n I am afraid I don't understand your criticism of the reasoning. The principle p –> it is true that p<\/em> strikes me as self-evident. Its 'intellectual luminosity,' if you will, will trump any putative counterexample. If snow is white, then it is true that snow is white; if grass is green, then it is true that grass is green; if it is possible that no thinkers and no truths exist, then it is true that it is possible that no truths and no thnkers exist. Now the point is that this last truth says how things are in a situation in which no thinkers exist; therefore it is a truth that cannot exist only if thinkers exist. It exists whether or not thinkers exist. <\/font><\/p>\n You write, "The sense in which the situation is admitted to be possible is purely negative<\/span> in that absent truths, no contradiction results<\/em>." I don't follow you. The situation is possible assuming that truth is a mere transcendental presupposition. Now suppose the possibility is actual. Then it will be true both that it is possible and that it is actual. So once again truth cannot be a mere transcendental presupposition.<\/font><\/p>\n You then say, " To say, however, that it is true<\/em> that the situation is possible, where truths are supposed to depend on cognizers, requires that the situation be possible in a positive<\/span> sense, i.e., it requires that something be<\/em> the case, not merely that contradictions not<\/em> be the case." But I am not claiming that truths are dependent on cognizers; I am refuting that view. If the existence of truths depends on cognizers, and cognizers exist contingently, then it is possible that there be no truths. But this is not possible since if, per impossibile<\/em>, it were the case that there are no truths, then this would be the case, i.e., would be true.<\/font><\/p>\n The ComBox is open if you want to discuss this further.<\/font><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Alan Rhoda e-mails: In a recent post you write: The objector is inviting us to consider the possible situation in which beings like us do not exist and no truths either. The claim that this situation is possible, however, is equivalent to the claim that it is true that this situation is possible. I think there's a … Continue reading “A Counterexample to P –> It is True that P<\/i>?”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[108,228],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-11665","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-logica-docens","category-truth"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/11665","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=11665"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/11665\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=11665"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=11665"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=11665"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}
The objector is inviting us to consider the possible situation in which beings like us do not exist and no truths either. The claim that this situation is possible, however, is equivalent to the claim that it is true<\/em> that this situation is possible.<\/span><\/span><\/span>
I think there's a mistake here. In general, p<\/em> does not entail it is true that p<\/em>. The envisioned scenario is a case in point. The sense in which the situation is admitted to be possible is purely negative<\/span> in that absent truths, no contradiction results<\/em>. To say, however, that it is true<\/em> that the situation is possible, where truths are supposed to depend on cognizers, requires that the situation be possible in a positive<\/span> sense, i.e., it requires that something be<\/em> the case, not merely that contradictions not<\/em> be the case.<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span> <\/font><\/p>\n