{"id":11654,"date":"2010-04-24T14:01:36","date_gmt":"2010-04-24T14:01:36","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2010\/04\/24\/the-truth-operator-and-the-truth-predicate\/"},"modified":"2010-04-24T14:01:36","modified_gmt":"2010-04-24T14:01:36","slug":"the-truth-operator-and-the-truth-predicate","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2010\/04\/24\/the-truth-operator-and-the-truth-predicate\/","title":{"rendered":"The Truth Operator and the Truth Predicate"},"content":{"rendered":"<p style=\"TEXT-ALIGN: justify\"><font face=\"Georgia\">This is an addendum to our <\/font><a href=\"http:\/\/maverickphilosopher.typepad.com\/maverick_philosopher\/2010\/04\/a-counterexample-to-p-it-is-true-that-p.html\"><font face=\"Georgia\">earlier discussion<\/font><\/a><font face=\"Georgia\"> which&#0160;I hope will advance it a step or two.&#0160;&#0160;We heard Alan Rhoda claim that the following sentence is false: &#39;If nothing exists, then it is true that nothing exists.&#39;&#0160; Let&#39;s think further about this.&#0160; We first note that &#39;If nothing exists, then it is true that nothing exists&#39; can be parsed in two ways:<\/font><\/p>\n<p style=\"TEXT-ALIGN: justify\"><em><font face=\"Georgia\">1. If nothing exists, then it is true that (nothing exists).<\/font><\/em><\/p>\n<p style=\"TEXT-ALIGN: justify\"><em><font face=\"Georgia\">2. If nothing exists, then it is true (that nothing exists).<\/font><\/em><\/p>\n<p style=\"TEXT-ALIGN: justify\"><font face=\"Georgia\">Call (1) the <strong>operator construal.<\/strong>&#0160; &#39;It is true that ( )&#39; is a sentential operator the operand of which is a sentence.&#0160; The result of the operation is itself a sentence.&#0160; If the operand is true, then the resulting sentence &#0160;is true.&#0160; If the operand is false, then the resulting sentence is false. Please note that prefixing &#39;It is true that&#39; to a sentence&#0160;cannot&#0160;change the truth-value of the sentence.&#0160; In this respect, the truth operator &#39;It is true that ( )&#39; is unlike the negation operator &#39;It is not the case that ( ).&#39;&#0160; Assuming Bivalence &#8212; as I have been doing throughout &#8212; if you negate a true sentence you get a false one, and vice versa.<\/font><\/p>\n<p style=\"TEXT-ALIGN: justify\"><font face=\"Georgia\">Call (2) the <strong>predicate construal.<\/strong>&#0160; The consequent of (2) is of course a sentence, but it is not the result or product of a sentential operator operating upon a sentence. For what is within the parentheses is not a sentence.&#0160; &#39;That nothing exists&#39; is not a sentence.&#0160; It&#0160;does not have a truth-value.&#0160; If I assertively utter it I do not convey a complete thought to my audience.&#0160; &#39;That nothing exists&#39; is the <em>name<\/em> of a proposition.&#0160; It follows that &#39;it is true&#39; in the consequent of (2) functions as a predicate as one can more clearly see from the equivalent<\/font><\/p>\n<p style=\"TEXT-ALIGN: justify\"><font face=\"Georgia\">3.&#0160; If nothing exists, then that&#0160;nothing exists is true.<\/font><\/p>\n<p style=\"TEXT-ALIGN: justify\"><font face=\"Georgia\">In (2) and (3)&#0160; a predicate is attached to a name, whereas in (1) this is not the case: a sentential operator is attached to a sentence.<\/font><\/p>\n<p style=\"TEXT-ALIGN: justify\"><font face=\"Georgia\">Not only are the parsings different, the ontological commitments are as well.&#0160; (2) commits us to propositions while (1) doesn&#39;t.&#0160; And (1) seems to commit us to operators while (2) doesn&#39;t.&#0160; <\/font><\/p>\n<p style=\"TEXT-ALIGN: justify\"><font face=\"Georgia\">Here is the place to comment on my asterisks convention.&#0160; Putting asterisks around a declarative sentence forms a name of the proposition expressed by the sentence.&#0160; &#39;The Moon is uninhabited&#39; is a declarative sentence.&#0160; &#39;*The Moon is uninhabited*&#39; is not a sentence but a name.&#0160; It names an entity that has a truth-value, but it itself does not have a truth-value.&#0160; (2) and (3) can also be rendered as<\/font><\/p>\n<p style=\"TEXT-ALIGN: justify\"><font face=\"Georgia\">4. If nothing exists, then *Nothing exists* is true.<\/font><\/p>\n<p style=\"TEXT-ALIGN: justify\"><font face=\"Georgia\">With the operator\/predicate distinction under our belts we may be in a position to see how&#0160;one philosopher (Alan) &#0160;could reasonably reject &#39;If nothing exists, then it is true that nothing exists&#39; while another&#0160;accepts it.&#0160; The one philosopher gives the original sentence the predicate construal which is committed to propositions.&#0160; This philosopher then reasons that, if nothing exists, then no propositions exist either, and are therefore not available to instantiate the property of being true.&#0160; The other philosopher gives the original sentence the operator construal and finds it impossible to understand how anyone could reject the original sentence so construed.&#0160; This philosopher insists that if nothing exists, then it is true that nothing exists; that this truth is not nothing, and that therefore it is something, which implies that it cannot be the case that nothing exists.<\/font><\/p>\n<p style=\"TEXT-ALIGN: justify\"><font face=\"Georgia\"><\/font>&#0160;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>This is an addendum to our earlier discussion which&#0160;I hope will advance it a step or two.&#0160;&#0160;We heard Alan Rhoda claim that the following sentence is false: &#39;If nothing exists, then it is true that nothing exists.&#39;&#0160; Let&#39;s think further about this.&#0160; We first note that &#39;If nothing exists, then it is true that nothing &hellip; <a href=\"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2010\/04\/24\/the-truth-operator-and-the-truth-predicate\/\" class=\"more-link\">Continue reading<span class=\"screen-reader-text\"> &#8220;The Truth Operator and the Truth Predicate&#8221;<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[6,108,467,228],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-11654","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-language-matters","category-logica-docens","category-retortion","category-truth"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/11654","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=11654"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/11654\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=11654"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=11654"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=11654"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}