{"id":11574,"date":"2010-05-27T16:13:52","date_gmt":"2010-05-27T16:13:52","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2010\/05\/27\/presentism-and-existence-entailing-relations-a-question-about-earlier-than\/"},"modified":"2010-05-27T16:13:52","modified_gmt":"2010-05-27T16:13:52","slug":"presentism-and-existence-entailing-relations-a-question-about-earlier-than","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2010\/05\/27\/presentism-and-existence-entailing-relations-a-question-about-earlier-than\/","title":{"rendered":"Presentism and Existence-Entailing Relations: An Aporetic Tetrad"},"content":{"rendered":"<p style=\"TEXT-ALIGN: justify\"><font face=\"Georgia\">It is plausibly maintained that all relations are existence-entailing. To illustrate from the dyadic case: if R relates <em>a<\/em> and <em>b<\/em>, then both <em>a<\/em> and <em>b<\/em> exist.&#0160;&#0160; A relation cannot hold unless the things between which or among which it holds all exist.&#0160; A weaker, and hence even more plausible, claim is that all relations are existence-symmetric: if R relates<em> a<\/em> and <em>b<\/em>, then either both relata exist or both do not exist. Both the stronger and the weaker claims rule out the possibility of a relation that relates an existent and a nonexistent. (So if Cerberus is eating my cat, then Cerberus exists. And if I am thinking about Cerberus, then, given that Cerberus does not exist, my thinking does not relate me to Cerberus.&#0160; This implies that&#0160; intentionality is not a relation, though it is, as Brentano says, relation-like (<em>ein Relativliches<\/em>).)<\/p>\n<p>But if presentism is true, and only temporally present items exist, then no relation connects a present with a nonpresent item. This seems hard to accept for the following reason.<\/p>\n<p>I ate&#0160;lunch &#0160;an hour ago. So the event of my eating (E) is earlier than the event of my typing (T). How can it be true that E bears the <em>earlier than<\/em> relation to T, and T bears the <em>later than<\/em> relation to E, unless both E and T exist? But E is nonpresent. If presentism is true, then E does not exist.&#0160; And if E does not exist, then E does not stand in the <em>earlier than<\/em> relation to T.&#0160; If, on the other hand, there are events that exist but are nonpresent, then presentism is false.<\/p>\n<p>How will the presentist respond? Since E does not exist on his view, while T does, and E is earlier than T, he must either (A) deny that all relations are existence-symmetric, or deny (B) that earlier than is a relation. He must either allow the possibility of genuine relations that connect nonexistents and existents, or deny that T stands in a temporal relation to E.<\/p>\n<p>To&#0160; fully savor the problem&#0160;we &#0160;cast it in the mold of an aporetic tetrad:<\/font><\/p>\n<p style=\"TEXT-ALIGN: justify\"><font face=\"Georgia\">1. All relations are either existence-entailing or existence-symmetric.<\/font><\/p>\n<p style=\"TEXT-ALIGN: justify\"><font face=\"Georgia\">2. <em>Earlier than<\/em> is a relation.<\/font><\/p>\n<p style=\"TEXT-ALIGN: justify\"><font face=\"Georgia\">3. Presentism: only temporally present items exist.<\/font><\/p>\n<p style=\"TEXT-ALIGN: justify\"><font face=\"Georgia\">4. Some events are earlier than others.<\/font><\/p>\n<p style=\"TEXT-ALIGN: justify\"><font face=\"Georgia\">Each limb of the tetrad is exceedingly plausible.&#0160; But they cannot all be true:&#0160; any three, taken together, entail the negation of the remaining limb.&#0160; For example, the first three entail the negation of the fourth.&#0160; To solve the problem, we must reject one of the limbs.&#0160; Now (4) cannot be rejected&#0160;because it is a datum.<\/font><\/p>\n<p style=\"TEXT-ALIGN: justify\"><font face=\"Georgia\">Will you deny (1) and say that there are relations that are neither existence-entailing nor existence-symmetric?&#0160; I find this hard to swallow because of the following argument.&#0160; (a) Nothing can have properties unless it exists.&#0160; Therefore (b) nothing can have relational properties unless it exists. (c) Every relation gives rise to relational properties:&#0160; if Rab, then a has the property of standing in R to b, and b has the property of standing in R to a.&#0160; Therefore, (d) if R relates a and b, then both a and b exist.<\/font><\/p>\n<p style=\"TEXT-ALIGN: justify\"><font face=\"Georgia\">Will you deny (2) and say that <em>earlier than<\/em> is not a relation?&#0160; What else could it be?<\/font><\/p>\n<p style=\"TEXT-ALIGN: justify\"><font face=\"Georgia\">Will you deny presentism and say that that both present and nonpresent items exist?&#0160; Since it is obvious that present and nonpresent items cannot exist in the present-tense sense of &#39;exists,&#39;&#0160; the suggestion has to be that present and nonpresent (past or future) items exist in a tenseless sense of &#39;exist.&#39;&#0160; But what exactly does this mean?<\/font><\/p>\n<p style=\"TEXT-ALIGN: justify\"><font face=\"Georgia\">The problem is genuine, but there appears to be no good solution, no solution that does not involve its own difficulties.<\/font><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>It is plausibly maintained that all relations are existence-entailing. To illustrate from the dyadic case: if R relates a and b, then both a and b exist.&#0160;&#0160; A relation cannot hold unless the things between which or among which it holds all exist.&#0160; A weaker, and hence even more plausible, claim is that all relations &hellip; <a href=\"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2010\/05\/27\/presentism-and-existence-entailing-relations-a-question-about-earlier-than\/\" class=\"more-link\">Continue reading<span class=\"screen-reader-text\"> &#8220;Presentism and Existence-Entailing Relations: An Aporetic Tetrad&#8221;<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[21,142,20,212,204],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-11574","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-aporetics","category-existence","category-metaphilosophy","category-relations","category-time-and-change"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/11574","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=11574"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/11574\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=11574"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=11574"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=11574"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}