{"id":11533,"date":"2010-06-08T19:50:12","date_gmt":"2010-06-08T19:50:12","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2010\/06\/08\/another-round-on-assertoric-force\/"},"modified":"2010-06-08T19:50:12","modified_gmt":"2010-06-08T19:50:12","slug":"another-round-on-assertoric-force","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2010\/06\/08\/another-round-on-assertoric-force\/","title":{"rendered":"Another Round on Assertoric Force"},"content":{"rendered":"

William Woking <\/font>comments<\/font><\/a>:<\/font><\/p>\n

Logical argument is just like a chess game. We have a common understanding of the rules of inference. The game ends either in reaching disagreement about a principle that is demonstrably fundamental, i.e., it self-evidently admits of no proof or disproof (e.g., Bill hates carrots), in which case stalemate, or where both sides end in agreeing upon a set of fundamental principles from which the truth of the winner's thesis follows with logical certainty.<\/font><\/p>\n

———————- The argument so far ————————-
<\/font><\/p>\n

(Woking Thesis) Expression types (e.g. declarative sentences) can have assertoric force.<\/font><\/p>\n

[Vallicella objection]
(Major) If an expression-type has assertoric force, every token of it has assertoric force
(Minor) A token of any sentence may occur in a context where it has no assertoric force
(Conclusion) No expression-type has assertoric force.<\/font><\/p>\n

(Proof of the minor) Take any declarative sentence-type such as 'Socrates runs'. But it has no assertoric force in the consequence 'If Socrates runs, Socrates moves'. <\/font><\/p>\n

(Reply to objection)
I concede the argument of the objection is valid. I concede the major. I dispute the minor. Against the proof of the minor. 'Socrates runs' does have assertoric force in the 'If Socrates runs, Socrates moves'. However, its force is cancelled out by the 'if then' operator.<\/font><\/p>\n

The minor is thus the bone of contention.  We agree that in 'If Socrates runs, then he moves' the protasis of the conditional lacks assertoric force.  (I note en passant <\/em>that the apodosis also lacks assertoric force.) But we disagree as to why the protasis of the conditional lacks assertoric force.  I say it is because no sentence-type intrinsically and as such has assertoric force.  Woking say is it is because there are contexts in which semantic cancellation removes the assertoric force which all declarative sentence-types possess intrinsically and as such.  <\/font><\/span><\/p>\n

One objection to semantic cancellation is that it is inconsistent with the thesis of the compositionality of meaning, a thesis which Woking accepts, together with the thesis that assertoric force is a semantic component.  According to compositionality of meaning, a sentence-type is a semantic whole composed of, and built up out of, semantic parts.  Now given that assertoric force is a semantic component, and that wholes have their parts essentially, then the meaning of a sentence-type has its assertoric meaning component essentially, which implies that no sentence-type can have its assertoric force removed by semantic cancellation.  So either no sentence-type has assertoric force, as I maintain, or every sentence-type has assertoric force, whence it follows, contrary to what Woking maintains, that it is not the case that some sentence-types do, and some do not, have their assertoric force removed by semantic cancellation.  The argument, then, is this:<\/font><\/span><\/p>\n

1. Compositionality of Meaning: The meaning of a sentence-type is a whole of parts.<\/font><\/span><\/p>\n

2. Assertoric force is a semantic component of the meaning of a sentence-type.<\/font><\/span><\/p>\n

3. Mereological Essentialism: wholes have their parts essentially: if x is a part of W, then necessarily x is a part of W.<\/font><\/span><\/p>\n

4. The assertoric force of the meaning of a sentence-type is essential to it. (from 1, 2, 3)<\/font><\/span><\/p>\n

5. If x is essential to y, then y cannot exist without x.<\/font><\/span><\/p>\n

6. The meaning of a sentence-type cannot exist without its assertoric component. (from 4, 5)<\/font><\/span><\/p>\n

7. A sentence-type's assertoric component, if it has one, cannot be removed by semantic cancellation, or in any other way. (from 6)<\/font><\/span><\/p>\n

8. Either no sentence-type or every sentence-type possesses assertoric force intrinsically and as such. (from 7)<\/font><\/span><\/p>\n

9. Some sentence-types do not possess assertoric force.<\/font><\/span><\/p>\n

10. No sentence-type possesses assertoric force intrinsically and as such. (from 8, 9)<\/font><\/span><\/p>\n

It appears that only by rejecting Mereological Essentialism can Woking evade this argument.  For the inferences are valid and the other premises he accepts.  But I should think that ME is far more credible than his somewhat vague talk of semantic cancellation.<\/font><\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

William Woking comments: Logical argument is just like a chess game. We have a common understanding of the rules of inference. The game ends either in reaching disagreement about a principle that is demonstrably fundamental, i.e., it self-evidently admits of no proof or disproof (e.g., Bill hates carrots), in which case stalemate, or where both … Continue reading “Another Round on Assertoric Force”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[408],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-11533","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-language-philosophy-of"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/11533","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=11533"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/11533\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=11533"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=11533"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=11533"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}