{"id":11424,"date":"2010-08-01T16:25:33","date_gmt":"2010-08-01T16:25:33","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2010\/08\/01\/thinking-about-nothing\/"},"modified":"2010-08-01T16:25:33","modified_gmt":"2010-08-01T16:25:33","slug":"thinking-about-nothing","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2010\/08\/01\/thinking-about-nothing\/","title":{"rendered":"Thinking About Nothing"},"content":{"rendered":"<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><font face=\"Georgia\">Suppose I try to think the counterfactual state of affairs of there being nothing, nothing at all.&#0160; Can I succeed in thinking pure nothingness?&#0160; Is this thought thinkable?&#0160; And if it is, does it show that it is <em>possible<\/em> that there be nothing at all?&#0160; If yes, then (i) it is contingent that anything exists, and (ii) everything that exists exists contingently, which implies that both of the following are false:<\/font><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><font face=\"Georgia\">1. Necessarily, something exists.&#0160; Nec(Ex)(x exists)<\/font><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><font face=\"Georgia\">2. Something necessarily exists.&#0160;&#0160; (Ex)Nec(x exists).&#0160;<\/font><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><font face=\"Georgia\">(1) and (2) are not the same proposition: (2) entails (1) but not conversely.<\/font><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><font face=\"Georgia\">Phylogenetically, this topic goes back&#0160;to Parmenides of Elea.&#0160; Ontogenetically,&#0160;it goes back to what was probably my first philosophical thought when I was about&#0160;eight or so years old.&#0160; (Ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny!) &#0160;I had been taught that God created everything distinct from himself.&#0160; One day, lying in bed and staring at the ceiling, &#0160;I thought: &quot;Well, suppose God never created anything.&#0160; Then only God would exist.&#0160; And if God didn&#39;t exist, then there would be nothing at all.&quot;&#0160; At this my head began to swim and I felt a strange wonder that I cannot quite recapture, although the memory remains strong 50 years later.&#0160; The unutterably strange thought that there might never have been anything at all &#8212; is this thought truly thinkable or does it cancel itself in the very attempt to think it?<\/font><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><font face=\"Georgia\">My <\/font><a href=\"http:\/\/maverickphilosopher.typepad.com\/maverick_philosopher\/2010\/07\/might-there-have-been-just-nothing-at-all.html\"><font face=\"Georgia\">earlier meditation<\/font><\/a><font face=\"Georgia\"> was to the effect that the thought cancels itself by issuing in contradiction.&#0160; (And so I concluded that necessarily there is something, an interesting metaphysical result arrived at by pure thought.) To put it as simply as possible, and avoiding the patois of &#39;possible worlds&#39;: If there were nothing, then it would be a fact that there is nothing.&#0160; And so there would be something, namely, that very fact.&#0160; After all, that fact has a definite content and can&#39;t be nothing.&#0160; But this is not quite convincing because, on the other hand, if there were truly nothing, then there wouldn&#39;t be this fact either.&#0160; <\/font><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><font face=\"Georgia\">On the one hand, nothingness is the <em>determinate<\/em> &#39;state&#39; of there being nothing at all.&#0160; Determinate, because it excludes there being something.&#0160; (Spinoza: <em>Omnis determinatio est negatio<\/em>.) On the other hand, nothingness is the nonbeing of absolutely everything, including this putative &#39;state.&#39;&#0160; That is about as pithy a formulation of the puzzle as I can come up with.<\/font><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><font face=\"Georgia\">Here is a puzzle of a similar structure.&#0160; If there were no truths, then it would be true that there are no truths, which implies that there is at least one truth.&#0160; The thought that there are no truths refutes itself.&#0160; Hence, necessarily, there is at least one truth.&#0160; On the other hand, if there &#39;truly&#39; were no truths, then there would be no truth that there are no truths.&#0160; <em>We<\/em> cannot deny that there are truths without presupposing that there are truths; but this does not prove the necessity of truths apart from us.&#0160; Or so the objection goes.<\/font><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><font face=\"Georgia\">How can we decide between these two plausible lines of argumentation?&#0160; <\/font><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><font face=\"Georgia\">But let me put it a third way so we get the full flavor of the problem.&#0160; This is the way things are: <em>Things exist.<\/em>&#0160;If nothing else, these very thoughts about being and nonbeing exist.&#0160; If nothing existed, would that then be the way things are?&#0160; If yes, then there is something, namely, the way things are.&#0160; Or should we say that, if nothing existed, then there would be no way things are, no truth, no maximal state of affairs?&#0160; In that case, no determinate &#39;possibility&#39; would be actual were nothing to exist.<\/font><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><font face=\"Georgia\">The last sentence may provide a clue to solving the problem.&#0160; If no determinate possibility would be actual were nothing to exist, then the thought of there being nothing at all lacks determinate content.&#0160; It follows that the thought that there is nothing&#0160;at all is unthinkable.&#0160; We may <em>say<\/em>, &#39;There might have been nothing at all,&#39; but we can attach no definite thought to those words.&#0160; So talking, we literally don&#39;t know what we are talking about.&#0160; We are merely mouthing words.&#0160; Because it is unthinkable that there be nothing at all, it is impossible, and so it is necessary that there be something.<\/font><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><em><font face=\"Georgia\">Parmenides vindicatus est.<\/font><\/em><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><font face=\"Georgia\">My conclusion is equivalent to the thesis that there is no such &#39;thing&#39; as indeterminate nonbeing.&#0160; Nonbeing is determinate:&#0160; it is always and necessarily the nonbeing <em>of something.<\/em>&#0160; For example, the nonbeing of Pierre, the nonbeing of the&#0160;cafe, the nonbeing of Paris&#0160; . . . the nonbeing of the Earth . . . the nonbeing of the physical universe . . . the nonbeing of everything that exists.&#0160; Nonbeing, accordingly, is defined by its exclusion of what exists.&#0160; <\/font><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><font face=\"Georgia\">The nonbeing of everything that exists is not on an ontological par with everything that exists.&#0160; The former is parasitic on the latter, as precisely the nonbeing <em>of the latter.<\/em>&#0160;Being and Nothing are not equal but opposite:&#0160; Nothing is derivative from Being as the negation of Being.&#0160; Hegel got off on the wrong foot at the beginning of his <em>Wissenschaft der Logik.<\/em>&#0160; And Heidegger, who also maintained that Being and Nothing are the same &#8212; though in a different sense than that intended by Hegel &#8212; was also out to lunch, if you&#39;ll pardon the mixed metaphor.<\/font><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><font face=\"Georgia\">If this is right, then nonbeing is not a source out of&#0160;which what is comes or came.&#0160; Accordingly, a sentence like &#39;The cosmos emerged from the womb of nonbeing,&#39; whatever poetic value it might have, is literally meaningless:&#0160; there is no nonbeing from which anything can emerge.<\/font><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify\"><font face=\"Georgia\">Being is. Nonbeing is not.&#0160; <\/font><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Suppose I try to think the counterfactual state of affairs of there being nothing, nothing at all.&#0160; Can I succeed in thinking pure nothingness?&#0160; Is this thought thinkable?&#0160; And if it is, does it show that it is possible that there be nothing at all?&#0160; If yes, then (i) it is contingent that anything exists, &hellip; <a href=\"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2010\/08\/01\/thinking-about-nothing\/\" class=\"more-link\">Continue reading<span class=\"screen-reader-text\"> &#8220;Thinking About Nothing&#8221;<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[142,218,467],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-11424","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-existence","category-nothingness","category-retortion"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/11424","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=11424"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/11424\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=11424"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=11424"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=11424"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}