{"id":1138,"date":"2023-11-16T11:17:01","date_gmt":"2023-11-16T11:17:01","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2023\/11\/16\/the-transcendental-argument-for-the-existence-of-god-a-first-response-to-flood\/"},"modified":"2023-11-16T11:17:01","modified_gmt":"2023-11-16T11:17:01","slug":"the-transcendental-argument-for-the-existence-of-god-a-first-response-to-flood","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2023\/11\/16\/the-transcendental-argument-for-the-existence-of-god-a-first-response-to-flood\/","title":{"rendered":"The Transcendental Argument for the Existence of God: A First Response to Flood"},"content":{"rendered":"

I thank Anthony G. Flood for his The Transcendental Argument for the Existence of God Revisited: Toward a Response to Bill Vallicella<\/a>.  Herewith, a first installment by way of rejoinder. Convergence upon agreement is not to be expected, but clarification of differences is an attainable goal. In any case, philosophy is a joy to its true acolytes, and in dark times a great consolation as well. Now let's get to work.<\/span><\/p>\n

Tony introduces the theme skillfully:<\/span><\/p>\n

\n

Preamble: if<\/em> the God of the Bible, who created human beings in his image to know and love him and to know, value, and rule the rest of creation under him (hereafter, \u201cGod\u201d), exists, then<\/em> we know one way that the conditions of intelligible predication (IP) can be met. The preceding sentence includes key aspects of the Christian worldview (CW)\u2014the Theos-anthropos-kosmos<\/em> relationship\u2014expressed on the pages of the Bible.<\/span><\/p>\n

If no alternative explanation for IP is possible, then Biblical theism is necessarily<\/em> true (which is what the CW predicts).<\/span><\/p>\n

[. . .]<\/span><\/p>\n

If no worldview other than the Christian (CW) can account for IP, if (as I now hold) an alternative to the CW when it comes to accounting for IP cannot even be conceived<\/em>, then to hold out for an alternative, as though doing so were an expression of rational exigency (\u201cdemandingness\u201d)\u2014that to reserve judgment somehow accords with epistemic duty\u2014models only dogmatic stubbornness, not tolerant liberality.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

Given the actual fact of intelligible predication, which is not in dispute, and assuming, as we must, the modal axiom ab esse ad posse valet illatio<\/em>, it follows that intelligible predication (IP) is possible. Necessarily, whatever is actual is possible. So we ask the transcendental question: <\/span>under what conditions is IP possible? What condition or conditions would have to obtain for it to be possible that there be actual cases of intelligible predication?  An example of an intelligible predication is any true or false statement, such as 'The Moon is presently uninhabited' which happens to be true, or its negation which happens to be false. <\/span><\/p>\n

Now I agree with Flood that <\/span>if<\/em> the God of the Christian Bible (hereafter 'God') exists, then<\/em> the condition or conditions of the possibility of IP are satisfied. The existence of God suffices<\/em> for the possibility of intelligible predication. But here we need to remind ourselves of a couple or three simple points of logic.<\/span><\/p>\n

The first is  that if X is sufficient for Y, it does not follow that X is necessary for Y. So if the existence of God is not only a sufficient but also a necessary condition of IP, this will require further argumentation. The second point is that to assert a conditional is not to assert either its antecedent\/protasis or its consequent\/apodosis.  To assert or affirm a conditional is to assert or affirm a connection between antecedent and consequent, the nature of the connection depending on the type of conditional it is, whether logical or nomological or whatever. The third point is that some conditionals are true despite having a false antecedent and a false consequent.<\/span><\/p>\n

And although it is not self-evident, I also agree with Flood that there is and must be some<\/em> condition or set of conditions that make IP possible. Let 'TC' stand for this transcendental condition or set of conditions. We agree then that the TC necessarily exists.<\/span><\/p>\n

We seem to have found some common — dare I say 'neutral'? — ground: (a) there are actual cases of IP; (b) given that they are actual, they are possible; (c) it is legitimate to launch a regressive (transcendental) inquiry into the condition or conditions of the possibility of these actual cases; (d) there must be such a transcendental condition; (e) the existence of God suffices for the possibility of IP. <\/span><\/p>\n

This leaves us with the question whether the God of the Christian Bible  = TC. Is God's existence not only sufficient but also both necessary for the possibility of IP? Flood will answer with alacrity in the affirmative: yes, God and God alone<\/em> is (numerically) identical to the ultimate transcendental condition of all intelligible predication. This of course implies that it is not possible that anything distinct from God be the TC. God necessarily exists, and is necessarily identical to the ultimate transcendental condition of intelligible predication.  <\/span><\/p>\n

But wait, there's more! Flood tells us that  "an alternative to the CW [the Christian worldview] when it comes to accounting for IP cannot even be conceived." <\/em>So it is not just impossible<\/em> that anything other than God be identical to the TC; this is inconceivable<\/em> as well. <\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Here is one of the places where Flood blunders: he confuses the epistemic modality inconceivability<\/em> with the ontic modality impossibility<\/em>. Conceivability and inconceivability are tied to the thinking powers of such  finite and limited intellects as ours. By contrast, what is possible and impossible in reality<\/em> are independent of what we frail reeds are able to think and unable to think.  I will have more to say about this in subsequent posts since it appears to be a trademark mistake of presuppositionalists to conflate epistemic and ontic modality.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

In any case, it is very easy to conceive of alternatives  to Flood's candidate for TC status. Here is a partial catalog of candidates in which (B), (C), and (D) are alternatives to Flood's candidate, (A).<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

A. Intelligible predication  presupposes the truth of the Christian worldview  (Van Til & Co.) as the transcendental condition of IP's very possibility.<\/span><\/p>\n

B. Intelligible predication presupposes the existence of God, but not the Christian worldview as the Calvinist Van Til and his followers calvinistically understand it, the essential commitments of which include such specifically Christian doctrines as Trinity, Incarnation, etc. as well as the specifically Calvinist TULIP doctrines. Some who call themselves Christians are unitarians and deniers of the divinity of Christ. Our friend Dale Tuggy is such a one.  And those the presuppositionalists refer to as 'Romanists' who do accept Trinity and Incarnation don't accept the specifically Calvinist add-ons.<\/span><\/p>\n

C. Intelligible predication presupposes the truth of Kant's transcendental idealism according to which "The understanding is the law-giver of nature," and space and time are a priori<\/em> forms of our sensibility.  For Kant the ultimate transcendental condition of the objective validity of every judgment, and thus of every intelligible predication, is located in the transcendental unity of apperception which is assuredly not God, whatever exactly it is. <\/span><\/p>\n

D. Intelligible predication presupposes, not the God of the Christian Bible, but  an immanent order and teleology in nature along the lines of Thomas Nagel's Mind and Cosmos <\/em>(Oxford 2012).<\/em> On Nagel's view, the rational order of nature is self-explanatory, a necessary feature of anything that could count as a cosmos. Nagel views the intelligibility of the world as "itself part of the deepest explanation why things are as they are." (17).  Now part of the way things are is that they are understandable by us.  Given that the way things are is intelligible, it follows that the intelligibility of the world is self-explanatory or self-grounding. "The intelligibility of the world is no accident." (17) But neither is it due to theistic intervention or imposition. "Nature is such as to give rise to conscious beings with minds; and it is such as to be comprehensible to such beings." (17) See my overview<\/a> of Nagel's book for details.<\/span><\/p>\n

I am not endorsing any of the above-listed alternatives to (A). They all have their problems as does (A). My point is that they are conceivable alternatives to (A). This being the case, Flood's asseveration, "an alternative to the CW [the Christian worldview] when it comes to accounting for IP cannot even be conceived" <\/em>is false.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

It is quite clear that what Van Til & Co. want is a rationally compelling, 'knock-down,' argument for the existence of the God of the Christian Bible calvininstically interpreted.  But they know (deep down even as they suppress the knowledge) that no circular argument is probative.  So they essay the above transcendental argument.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

What I have shown, however, is that the transcendental argument is not probative.  It fails to establish that the God of the Christian Bible is both sufficient and necessary<\/em> for the possibility of intelligible predication. At most, it renders rationally acceptable<\/em> the conclusion that the God of the Christian Bible exists.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

I am not denying that the God of the Christian Bible exists. Nor am I denying that if<\/em> said God exists, then<\/em> he flawlessly executes all the transcendental functions that need executing.  How could he fail to? In particular, how could he fail to be the ultimate ungrounded transcendental-ontological ground of intelligible predication?  My point is that the presuppositionalists have not proven, i.e., established with objective certainty, that God alone could play the transcendental role.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

\n

 <\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

I thank Anthony G. Flood for his The Transcendental Argument for the Existence of God Revisited: Toward a Response to Bill Vallicella.  Herewith, a first installment by way of rejoinder. Convergence upon agreement is not to be expected, but clarification of differences is an attainable goal. In any case, philosophy is a joy to its … Continue reading “The Transcendental Argument for the Existence of God: A First Response to Flood”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[191,143,379,81,194],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-1138","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-atheism-and-theism","category-god","category-transcendental-arguments","category-transcendental-philosophy","category-van-til-and-presuppositionalism"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1138","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1138"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1138\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1138"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1138"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1138"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}