{"id":11043,"date":"2010-12-20T06:41:51","date_gmt":"2010-12-20T06:41:51","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2010\/12\/20\/death-as-a-relational-harm\/"},"modified":"2010-12-20T06:41:51","modified_gmt":"2010-12-20T06:41:51","slug":"death-as-a-relational-harm","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2010\/12\/20\/death-as-a-relational-harm\/","title":{"rendered":"Death as a Relational Harm?"},"content":{"rendered":"

Here is some Epicurean reasoning:<\/span><\/p>\n

1. Death is annihilation. (Materialist assumption)<\/span>
2. A harm is a harm to someone or something: for there to be a harm, there must be a subject of harm. (Conceptual truth)<\/span>
3. Nothing is a subject of a harm at a time at which it does not exist. (Plausible principle)<\/span>
Therefore<\/span>
4. No dead person is a subject of harm. <\/span>
Therefore<\/span>
5. Death (being dead) cannot be a harm to one who is dead.<\/span><\/p>\n

Assuming that (1) is accepted, the only way of resisting this argument is by rejecting (3).  And it must be admitted that (3), though plausible, can be reasonably rejected.  Suppose I promise a dying man that I will take good care of his young and healthy dog.  But I renege on my promise in order  to save myself the hassle by having the dog euthanized.  Epicurus in hand, I reason, "There is no harm to my friend since he doesn't exist, and there is no harm to the dog because its transition to nonexistence will be quick and painless.  Caring for the dog, however, is a harm to me.  Sure, I will break my promise, but on consequentialist grounds, what's wrong with that?" <\/span><\/p>\n

Thomas Nagel would disagree and call my reneging "an injury to the dead man."  ("Death" in Mortal Questions<\/em>, Cambridge UP, 1979, p. 6)  For Nagel, "There are goods and evils which are irreducibly relational; they are features of the relations between a person, with spatial and temporal boundaries of the usual sort, and circumstances which may not coincide with him either in space or in time." (p. 6)  Death is such an evil.  Being dead is a circumstance that does not temporally coincide with the decedent.  In other words, a thing can have properties at times at which it does not exist provided it once existed. (Few if any would claim that a thing can have properties at times at which it does not exist if it never existed.  And so it is not an evil for Schopenhauer's never- existent son 'Will' that he never existed.)<\/span><\/p>\n

A Nagelian rejection of (3) is respectable and plausible as a means of turning aside the Epicurean argument.  But it is scarcely compelling.  For the Epicurean can simply insist that there are no relational harms.  After all, there is something metaphysically murky about maintaining that a person who is nothing is yet the subject of a harm or injury simply on the strength of his having once existed.  If you are now nothing, then you are now nothing: why should your once having been be relevant?<\/span><\/p>\n

So it looks like a stand-off, an aporetic impasse.  The considerations for and against (3) seem to cancel each other.<\/span><\/p>\n

One consideration in favor of (3) is presentism, the doctrine that the present time and its contents alone exist.  If the present alone exists, then past individuals do not exist at all.  If so, they cannot be subject to harms.  A consideration contrary to (3) is our strong intuition that harms and injuries can indeed be inflicted upon the dead.  The dead may not have desires, but we are strongly inclined to say that they have interests, interests subject to violation.  (The literary executor who burns the manuscripts entrusted to him; the agent of Stalin who deletes references to Trotsky from historical documents, etc.)<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Here is some Epicurean reasoning: 1. Death is annihilation. (Materialist assumption)2. A harm is a harm to someone or something: for there to be a harm, there must be a subject of harm. (Conceptual truth)3. Nothing is a subject of a harm at a time at which it does not exist. (Plausible principle)Therefore4. No dead person … Continue reading “Death as a Relational Harm?”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[184,397],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-11043","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-death-and-immortality","category-epicureanism"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/11043","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=11043"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/11043\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=11043"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=11043"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=11043"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}