{"id":11004,"date":"2011-01-17T11:16:03","date_gmt":"2011-01-17T11:16:03","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2011\/01\/17\/a-reply-to-ockhams-nominalism\/"},"modified":"2011-01-17T11:16:03","modified_gmt":"2011-01-17T11:16:03","slug":"a-reply-to-ockhams-nominalism","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2011\/01\/17\/a-reply-to-ockhams-nominalism\/","title":{"rendered":"A Reply to “Ockham’s Nominalism”"},"content":{"rendered":"

The following is a response to "Ockham's Nominalism"<\/a>  by our London sparring partner, Edward Ockham.  His words are in black, mine are in blue.  Comments are enabled.<\/span><\/p>\n

At this stage, I should discuss Peter Lupu\u2019s objections (mostly in the extended comment on Vallicella\u2019s blog <\/span>here<\/a>) to the nominalist program.<\/span><\/p>\n

I should first explain what I think the nominalist program is. I am taking my lead from a principle that William of Ockham neatly formulates in his Summa Logicae<\/em> book I, chapter 51, where he accuses 'the moderns' of two errors, and says that the root of the second error is \u201cto multiply entities according to the multiplicity of terms and to suppose that every term has something real (quid rei<\/em>) corresponding to it\u201d. He says grumpily that this is erroneous and leads far away from the truth. ('Radix est multiplicare entia secundum multitudinem terminorum, et quod quilibet terminus habet quid rei; quod tamen abusivum est et a veritate maxime abducens'). See also an early definition of nominalism here<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

What does he mean? Well he says that it is an error. He implies it is a common one, by attributing to the moderns and by the fact he mentions it all. Thus he implies that there exist terms which do not<\/em> have something real corresponding to them.<\/span><\/p>\n

A net that snags every fish in the sea brings in too large a catch.  The trouble with the above explanation of nominalism is that it will be accepted by almost all philosophers, including plenty who would not identify themselves as nominalists.  For few if any philosophers hold that for each word in a sentence there is a corresponding referent.  Consider <\/span><\/p>\n

1. Nobody came to the party.<\/span><\/p>\n

No one will take 'nobody' in (1) as a name.  ("Well, I'm glad to hear that at least one person showed up.  How is Nobody doing these days?")  (1) is easily analyzed so as to remove the apparent reference of 'nobody.'  And the same goes for a long list of other synsemantic or syncategorematical expressions.  Would any philosopher say that in <\/span><\/p>\n

2. I'm a day late and a dollar short<\/span><\/p>\n

every word has a referent?  Edward needs to give examples of philosophers who hold that 'nobody' in (1) and 'and' in (2) have referents.  Let us hope he does not weasel out of this challenge.  Since no one assumes that every term has something real corresponding to it, the above definition of 'nominalism' is too broad to be of any use.<\/span><\/p>\n

If Ockham is correct, the relevant distinction to draw is between queer and straight terms. Straight terms have something real corresponding to them, queer terms don\u2019t. Furthermore, there must at least be some temptation to imagine that queer terms refer to or denote something, otherwise there would be little point in making it.<\/span><\/p>\n

There is no need for this bizarre terminological innovation.  We already have 'autosemantic' and 'synsemantic' and equivalents.  Do not multiply terminology beyond necessity! <\/span><\/p>\n

And let us note that synsemantic terms have useful semantic roles to play despite their not referring to anything.  There is a rather striking difference between 'I will come' and 'I will not come,' a difference that rides on the synsemantic particle 'not' which, as synsemantic, does not refer to anything.<\/span><\/p>\n

Which brings me to the main point raised by Peter Lupu, who asks \u201cWhat are \u2018queer-entities\u2019 and how do we determine whether a given entity is \u201cqueer\u201d or \u201cstraight\u201d? There are two parts to his question. In answer to the first, there are no such things as queer entities, if Ockham is right. There are only \u2018queer terms\u2019. These, by definition, are terms that don\u2019t refer to or denote anything, and so by implication there are no \u2018queer entities\u2019.<\/span><\/p>\n

In other words, synsemantic terms do not refer.  True by definition.<\/span><\/p>\n

This is what makes any debate with realists difficult. Realists, namely those who think that queer terms refer, will persist in using the queer terms as if they did refer, and so will ask what kinds of thing are referred to, what is their \u2018ontological status\u2019 and so on. Ockhamists will naturally refuse to use these terms as if they referred, and refer the names of the terms instead, typically by using real or scare quotes.<\/span><\/p>\n

No, realists are not those who think that queer terms refer since no one thinks that queer, i.e., nonreferring terms, refer.  Edward needs to explain the criteria for deciding whether a given term is queer or straight.  Is 'Edward' a queer term?  If not, why not?<\/span><\/p>\n

[. . .]<\/span><\/p>\n

That deals with Peter's first question. What are queer entities? We can't say, because there are no such things, just as we can't say what kind of things ghosts are. But we can say what 'queer terms' are. These are terms that are categorical, but which (a) have no reference or denotation and (b) appear, or are believed by many, typically on grounds of reason alone, to have a reference or denotation.<\/span><\/p>\n

This doesn't advance the discussion at all.  First of all, we are not told what 'categorical' means.  More importantly, we have not been supplied with criteria for distinguishing queer from straight terms, to acquiesce for the nonce in this idiotic terminology.  <\/span><\/p>\n

Peter\u2019s second point, on how we determine whether given entity is \u201cqueer\u201d or \u201cstraight\u201d, I will leave for the next post, although clearly the first point applies here also. If the nominalist is right, we cannot ask this question of anything, just as we cannot ask whether a UFO came from Alpha centauri or Betelgeuse. We can only ask whether a given term<\/em> is queer or straight. More to follow.<\/span><\/p>\n

This doesn't get us anywhere.  We can ask, of a given term, whether or not it has a referent.  But then we need to be supplied with some method for answering this question.  Consider <\/span><\/p>\n

3. Wisdom is a virtue.<\/span><\/p>\n

Presumably, Edward will put 'wisdom' down as queer.  But on what grounds?  Is it because  he just knows (again by what method?) that everything that exists is a particular, and that if 'wisdom' has a referent then it must be a universal?  Or is there something about the word itself that tips him off that it is nonreferring?  <\/span><\/p>\n

Is he appealing to some paraphrastic method?  Is he suggesting that what (3) expresses can be expressed salva significatione<\/em> by a sentence containing no term making an apparent reference to a universal?  And in particular, would he accept the following paraphrase:<\/span><\/p>\n

3*.  If anyone is wise, then he is virtuous?<\/span><\/p>\n

So far, then, Londonistas 0, Phoenicians 1.<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

The following is a response to "Ockham's Nominalism"  by our London sparring partner, Edward Ockham.  His words are in black, mine are in blue.  Comments are enabled. At this stage, I should discuss Peter Lupu\u2019s objections (mostly in the extended comment on Vallicella\u2019s blog here) to the nominalist program. I should first explain what I think … Continue reading “A Reply to “Ockham’s Nominalism””<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[83],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-11004","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-nominalism-and-realism"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/11004","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=11004"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/11004\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=11004"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=11004"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=11004"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}