{"id":10884,"date":"2011-02-28T16:00:56","date_gmt":"2011-02-28T16:00:56","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2011\/02\/28\/why-the-resistance-to-modes-of-being-1\/"},"modified":"2011-02-28T16:00:56","modified_gmt":"2011-02-28T16:00:56","slug":"why-the-resistance-to-modes-of-being-1","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2011\/02\/28\/why-the-resistance-to-modes-of-being-1\/","title":{"rendered":"Why the Resistance to Modes of Being?"},"content":{"rendered":"

Why do so many distinguished philosophers  fail to appreciate that a doctrine of modes of being (modes of existence) is a live option?  Perhaps in the back of their minds is some such argument as the following:<\/span><\/p>\n

Existence is instantiation<\/span>
There are no modes of instantiation<\/span>
Ergo<\/span>
There are no modes of existence.<\/span><\/p>\n

I grant that there are no modes of instantiation: either a concept is instantiated or it is not.  But existence is not instantiation.  I have gone over this ground many times before on this blog and in my existence book and in journal articles, so I will be very brief.  <\/span><\/p>\n

I exist.  That's certain.  It is also certain that I am an individual and that no individual can be instantiated.  So if existence is instantiation, then there must be something distinct from me, a  concept or property or cognate item, the instantiation of which is (identically) my existence.  But now three points. First, there is no such concept or property.  Such a property would have to be a haecceity property and there are none.<\/a>   Second, even if there were such a property, I wouldn't be able to grasp it.  Individuum ineffabile est.<\/em>  Equally ineffable is a property of the form identity-with-a<\/em>, where 'a' denotes an individual.  Third, to account for the existence of an individual in terms of the instantiation of some concept or property is blatantly circular:  if a first-level property instantiated,then it is instantiated by something that exists.  <\/em><\/span><\/p>\n

So the above argument is not sound. Let's try another:<\/span><\/p>\n

'Exists(s)' is univocal<\/span>
If there are modes of existence, then 'exist(s)' is not univocal<\/span>
Ergo<\/span>
There are no modes of existence.<\/span><\/p>\n

I concede the minor, but not the major.  Compare<\/span><\/p>\n

1. Philosophers exist<\/span>
2. Peter exists.<\/span><\/p>\n

Both sentences are true, hence both are meaningful.  But 'exist(s)' does not have the same meaning in both.  (1) makes an instantiation claim: it says that the concept philosopher<\/em> or the property of being a philosopher is instantiated.  But (2), quite plainly, does NOT make an instantiation claim.  So 'exist(s)' in the two sentences cannot be univocal in sense.  But it is not equivocal in the way 'bank' is in<\/span><\/p>\n

3. No Boston bank (financial instituiton) is situated on the bank of the river Charles.<\/span><\/p>\n

We could say that the equivocity of 'exist(s)'as between (1)and (2) is a systematic equivocity in that the senses are connected. How? Well, if there are philosophers, if philosophers exist, then there must be at least one person, Peter say,  who exists and who is a philosopher.  And if Peter, who is a philosopher, exists, then we can straightaway infer that philosophers exist.<\/span><\/p>\n

So is it not perfectly obvious that 'exist(s)' is not univocal?  Note the ambiguity of<\/span><\/p>\n

4. Wisdom exists.<\/span><\/p>\n

(4) could be taken to mean that wisdom has instances, that there are wise people.  But it could also be taken to mean that wisdom itself <\/em>exists.  So from this one example it is clear that 'exist(s)' is not univocal.<\/span><\/p>\n

The second argument, then, is as unsound as the first.  At this point the establishmentarians may try to ENFORCE univocity by stipulating that 'exist(s)' SHALL MEAN  'is instantiated.'  But that has all the advantages of theft over honest toil, and besides, two can play that game.  I could, with more justice, stipulate that there is no legitimate use of 'exist(s)' except as a first-level predicate.<\/span><\/p>\n

Finally, they may argue as follows:<\/span><\/p>\n

If there are modes of existence, then existence is a property of individuals.<\/span>
Existence is not a property of individuals<\/span>
Ergo<\/span>
There are no modes of existence.<\/span><\/p>\n

Whether this argument is sound depends on what is meant by 'property.'  Existence is obviously not a quidditative property of any individual.  And existence is not a property of individuals if that is taken to imply that existents instantiate existence. But surely existence belongs to individuals and is in this sense a property of them. Accordingly, I reject  this third argument by denying the minor.<\/span><\/p>\n

So as far as I can see the case against modes of existence is extremely weak.<\/span> <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Why do so many distinguished philosophers  fail to appreciate that a doctrine of modes of being (modes of existence) is a live option?  Perhaps in the back of their minds is some such argument as the following: Existence is instantiationThere are no modes of instantiationErgoThere are no modes of existence. I grant that there are … Continue reading “Why the Resistance to Modes of Being?”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[142],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-10884","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-existence"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/10884","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=10884"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/10884\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=10884"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=10884"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=10884"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}