{"id":10871,"date":"2011-03-04T05:16:13","date_gmt":"2011-03-04T05:16:13","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2011\/03\/04\/thomistic-essences-and-modes-of-being\/"},"modified":"2011-03-04T05:16:13","modified_gmt":"2011-03-04T05:16:13","slug":"thomistic-essences-and-modes-of-being","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2011\/03\/04\/thomistic-essences-and-modes-of-being\/","title":{"rendered":"Review : Modes of Being"},"content":{"rendered":"

Herewith, a little summary of part of what I have been arguing.  Most analytic philosophers would accept (A) but not (B):<\/span><\/p>\n

A. There are kinds of existent but no kinds of existence.<\/span>
B. There are kinds of existent and also kinds of existence.<\/span><\/p>\n

I have been defending the intelligibility of (B) but without committing myself to any particular MOB doctrine.    I use 'modes of being' and 'kinds of existence' interchangeably. Of course I grant to Reinhardt Grossmann and others that the following inference is invalid:<\/span><\/p>\n

1. K1 and K2 are dramatically different categories of existent<\/span>
Ergo<\/span>
2. Instances of K1 differ from instances of K2 in their mode of existence.<\/span><\/p>\n

But an invalid argument can have a true conclusion.  So one can cheerfully grant the invalidity of the inference from (1) to (2) while insisting that there are categories  the respective members of which differ in their very mode of existence.  For example, although one cannot straightaway infer from the dramatic difference between (primary) substances and accidents that substances and accidents differ in their mode of existence, it is difficult to understand how they could fail to so differ.  After all, accidents depend on substances in that they cannot exist except in substances as modifications of substances, and this dependence is neither causal nor logical.  So I say it is existential dependence. <\/span><\/p>\n

Consider a bulge in a carpet.  The bulge cannot exist apart from the carpet whose bulge it is, whereas the carpet can exist without any bulge.  You might be tempted to say that bulge and carpet both simply exist, but that they are counterfactually related: Had the carpet not existed, the bulge would not have existed.  That's true, but what makes it true?  I say it is the fact of the bulge's existential dependence on the carpet.  Accidents exist in a different way than substances.<\/span><\/p>\n

You could resist this conclusion by simply denying that there are substances and accidents.  Fine, but then I will shift to another example, wholes and parts, say.  Do you have the chutzpah to deny that there are wholes and parts?  Consider again the house made of bricks.  And now try this aporetic pentad on for size:<\/span><\/p>\n

1. The house exists.  <\/span>
2. The bricks exist.  <\/span>
3. The house is not the bricks.  <\/span>
4. The house is not something wholly diverse from the bricks, something in addition to it, something over and above it.  <\/span>
5.  'Exist(s)' is univocal. <\/span><\/p>\n

The pentad is inconsistent: the limbs cannot all be true.  So what are you going to do?  Deny (1) like van Inwagen?  Maybe that is not crazy, but surely it is extreme.  (2), (3), and (4) are are undeniable.  So I say we ought to deny (5).  The house does not exist in the same way as the bricks.<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Herewith, a little summary of part of what I have been arguing.  Most analytic philosophers would accept (A) but not (B): A. There are kinds of existent but no kinds of existence.B. There are kinds of existent and also kinds of existence. I have been defending the intelligibility of (B) but without committing myself to any particular MOB … Continue reading “Review : Modes of Being”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[142,86],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-10871","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-existence","category-wholes-and-parts"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/10871","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=10871"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/10871\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=10871"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=10871"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=10871"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}