{"id":10692,"date":"2011-05-17T12:04:50","date_gmt":"2011-05-17T12:04:50","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2011\/05\/17\/david-gordon-reviews-peikoff\/"},"modified":"2011-05-17T12:04:50","modified_gmt":"2011-05-17T12:04:50","slug":"david-gordon-reviews-peikoff","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2011\/05\/17\/david-gordon-reviews-peikoff\/","title":{"rendered":"David Gordon to Teach Course on Ayn Rand"},"content":{"rendered":"

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I received an e-mail message this morning from David Gordon of the Ludwig von Mises Institute.<\/a>  He tells me that he will be teaching an online course entitled Ayn Rand and Objectivism.<\/a>  He also informs me that the Rand crowd, having got wind of the fact, have begun attacking him.<\/a>  They focus on Gordon's 1994 Journal of Libertarian Studies<\/em> review of Peikoff's Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand. <\/em> A bit of the review is <\/span>reproduced below. I have added some comments in blue and have marked some passages I consider important in red. <\/span><\/p>\n

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Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand<\/em>. By Leonard Peikoff. New York: Dutton, 1991.<\/span><\/p>\n

Leonard Peikoff does not hold humility to be a virtue. Still, I was startled to read that "this book is the definitive statement of Ayn Rand's philosophy-as interpreted by her best student and chosen heir" (p. xv). Peikoff has devoted careful thought to the correct arrangement of topics, so that he can best set forward the systematic nature of Rand's philosophy. In pursuit of this goal, he has the advantage of thirty years of close association with Miss Rand; in addition, he is himself a professional philosopher. After perusal of the preface, the reader's enthusiasm can barely be contained.<\/span><\/p>\n

Objectivism begins with a basic axiom: Existence exists. By this, Rand does not mean that the universal "existence" exists: Rather, "'[e]xistence' here is a collective noun, denoting the sum of existents" (p. 4, parentheses omitted). I do not suppose anyone will quarrel with this; nor does the second axiom, the fact of consciousness, occasion any misgiving. With commendable caution, Peikoff notes that the concept of existence "does not specify that a physical world exists" (p. 5). This seems reasonable: It does not follow from the fact that something exists that any physical objects exist. How one gets from one to the other is precisely the problem posed by Descartes at the beginning of modern philosophy. How does one know that anything besides one's sense-data and consciousness exists?<\/span><\/p>\n

Peikoff is guilty of a slight sin of omission, however. Although he does not take the axiom of existence to imply a physical world, he later talks glibly about how perception takes place through the body's contact with external objects and rejects with contempt any skepticism about the senses. Yet he never offers the slightest argument that the physical world exists. I do not mean to suggest that we need to prove that the physical world exists. It may well be that this is a basic fact that, as G. E. Moore argued, must be accepted without further justification. David Kelley, another philosopher of Randian sympathies, takes<\/span><\/p>\n

136 THE JOURNAL OF LIBERTARIAN STUDIES<\/span><\/p>\n

exactly this line in his excellent book The Evidence of the Senses<\/em>.' But Peikoff does not adopt this view: He nowhere mentions the existence of the world as a separate principle. How then does it enter the picture? Peikoff's problems have just begun. One more axiom must be considered: the law of identity, A is A. Peikoff has a remarkable propensity to draw odd conclusions from this uncontestable truth.<\/span> For one thing, we learn that in "any given set of circumstances . . . there is only one action possible to an entity, the action expressive of its identity. This is the action it will take, the action that is caused and necessitated by its nature" (p. 14). But why does Peikoff assume that an entity's nature allows it to perform only one action in given conditions? What if several actions are consistent with the thing's nature? Peikoff himself recognizes the point where human beings are concerned. "The law of causality affirms a necessary connection between entities and their actions. It does not however, specify any particular kind of entity or of action. . . .[It] does not affirm or deny the reality of an irreducible choice" (p. 68). Thus, the law of identity allows only one action in given circumstances, except when Peikoff decides that it does not.<\/span><\/p>\n

BV: A more basic criticism is warranted.  The immediate inference from 'A is A' to 'Things have natures' is a blatant non sequitur<\/em>.  The truth of the premise is consistent with the negation of the conclusion.  A thing has a nature only if it has a property or a set of properties that it cannot fail to have, that it cannot exist without.  But it is consistent with 'A is A' that a thing have all of its properties accidentally, in which case it would lack a nature.  The point is not that things do not have natures; the point is that a thing's having a nature does not follow from the Law of Identity.  One cannot squeeze (i.e. validily infer) a substantive thesis of metaphysics out of a mere law of logic.  And of course it is intellectually dishonest to pack the controversial thesis into what one means by 'A is A.'  That has all the virtues of theft over honest toil as Russell remarked in a different connection.<\/span><\/p>\n

By no means has Peikoff finished with A is A. "As soon as one says about any such [non-man-made] fact: 'It is'-just that much-the whole Objectivist metaphysics is implicit. . . . Such a fact has to be; no alternative to it is possible. . . . 'To be,' accordingly, is 'to be necessary"' (p. 24).<\/span> But even if one grants Peikoff's interpretation of causality, this conclusion does not follow. According to Peikoff, given any (non-made-made) entity, it must act in a certain way. From this, Peikoff concludes that the fact that the entity so acts is necessary. But all that he is entitled to conclude is that if the entity in question exists, its action is necessary. Peikoff jumps from this to the claim that the existence of the entity itself is necessary. The earth, by its nature, rotates on its axis. But the fact that on November 22, 1963, the earth rotated on its axis might for all that Peikoff has shown have been false. What if the earth had not existed on that date? Perhaps in reply Peikoff might claim that the earth exists because of the action of other entities; thus its existence is indeed necessary, since these entities had to act in the way they did. But this simply renews the problem: Did these entities have to exist? And in any event, Peikoff does not claim that every entity is caused to exist. The universe, in particular, has no cause. Why then must the entities that form it exist? Peikoff has completely failed to show that "[leaving aside the man-made, nothing is possible except what is actual" (p. 28).<\/span><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

BV: Gordon's criticism is on target.<\/span>  The Randians seem quite hopeless when it comes to modal reasoning.  See my Modal Confusion in Rand\/Peikoff.<\/a><\/span><\/a><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

Book Reviews 137<\/span><\/p>\n

The law of identity has more wonders in store. From it, we know that God <\/span>does not exist. God is an infinite being, but '"[infinite' does not mean large, <\/span>it means larger than any specific quantity, i.e., of no specific quantity. An infinite <\/span>quantity would be a quantity without identity. But A is A. Every entity, <\/span>accordingly, is finite" (p. 31). As Duns Scotus pointed out long ago, "infinite" <\/span>when applied to God is an adverb: It modifies his attributes. If God is infinite <\/span>in power, for example, his power is such that he can accomplish whatever he <\/span>wishes that does not violate the laws of logic. But God's power is perfectly definite <\/span>in character: It is not, as Peikoff thinks, an indefinitely large quantity. To say <\/span>that God has power over everything is not to say that his power is "without <\/span>form and void." To make matters worse, Peikoff appeals for support here to <\/span>Aristotle's argument that the actual infinite does not exist (pp. 31-34). But this <\/span>argument refers to bodies extended in space and is irrelevant to Peikoff's pur<\/span>pose. As will soon become apparent, the history of philosophy is not one of <\/span>Peikoff's strong points.<\/span><\/p>\n

How amazing is that simple principle, A is A! From its study we can derive <\/span>not only facts about the world but appropriate attitudes toward them. "Meta<\/span>physically given facts are reality. As such, they are not subject to anyone's <\/span>appraisal; they must be accepted without evaluation. Facts of reality must be greeted <\/span>not by approval or condemnation, praise or blame, but by a silent nod of <\/span>acquiescence" (p. 25). Only the man-made can be evaluated; one can, however, <\/span>evaluate "physical concretes in relation to a human goal" (p. 464, n. 16). I had <\/span>never before realized how irrational I had been in admiring the Grand Canyon.<\/span><\/p>\n

And when Kant, that fountainhead of evil, said that the starry heavens above <\/span>filled him with awe, what more might he have said to manifest his disordered <\/span>mind! How acquiescence is supposed to follow the recognition of necessity, I <\/span>entirely fail to see. Why should we confine our approval or disapproval to what <\/span>we can alter?<\/span><\/p>\n

But I had temporarily forgotten: A is A. To disapprove of what exists is to <\/span>rewrite reality (p. 27). If, for instance, a skeptic condemns "human knowledge <\/span>as invalid because it rests on sensory data" (p. 27), he attempts to rewrite reality <\/span>and has sinned grievously against reason. "But if knowledge does rest on sensory <\/span>data, then it does so necessarily, and again no alternative can even be imagined" <\/span>(p. 27). Once more Peikoff's point escapes me. The skeptic questions whether <\/span>sensory data suffice for knowledge of the external world. How does it answer <\/span>him to say that, necessarily, we rely on the senses? Even if no other model of <\/span>cognition is imaginable, this hardly shows that the one we have is adequate.<\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/span><\/span><\/span>[. . .]<\/span><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

I received an e-mail message this morning from David Gordon of the Ludwig von Mises Institute.  He tells me that he will be teaching an online course entitled Ayn Rand and Objectivism.  He also informs me that the Rand crowd, having got wind of the fact, have begun attacking him.  They focus on Gordon's 1994 … Continue reading “David Gordon to Teach Course on Ayn Rand”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[175],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-10692","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-rand-ayn"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/10692","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=10692"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/10692\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=10692"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=10692"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=10692"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}