{"id":10659,"date":"2011-06-02T16:58:57","date_gmt":"2011-06-02T16:58:57","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2011\/06\/02\/does-meinong-multiply-entities-beyond-necessity\/"},"modified":"2011-06-02T16:58:57","modified_gmt":"2011-06-02T16:58:57","slug":"does-meinong-multiply-entities-beyond-necessity","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2011\/06\/02\/does-meinong-multiply-entities-beyond-necessity\/","title":{"rendered":"Does Meinong Multiply Entities Beyond Necessity?"},"content":{"rendered":"<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">There is a very good and a very simple reason why Meinong cannot be accused of multiplying entities <\/span><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">&#0160;beyond necessity, and that is because his characteristic objects are not entities! An entity, by definition, is anything that is or has being. Since Meinongian objects lack being, they are not entities.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">The golden mountain and the round square, to take the two most celebrated, neither exist, nor subsist, nor have any mode of being whatsoever. This is a point that is often missed. Misled by Russell, many think that Meinong&#39;s possibilia and impossibilia have a mode of being weaker than existence. Not so: his objects are<em> jenseits von Sein und Nichtsein<\/em>, beyond being and nonbeing. They are <em>ausserseiend<\/em>,&#0160;&#0160; outside of being. Indeed, he speaks of <em>das Aussersein des reinen Gegenstandes<\/em>. The phrase is hard to translate, but &quot;the extrabeing of the pure object&quot; approximates to its sense. The point is that an&#0160;&#0160; object like the golden mountain is a pure <em>Sosein<\/em>: its <em>Sein<\/em> is exhausted by its <em>Sosein<\/em>, its being by its being-so. It is a pure what, a pure essence wihout being.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">I reject Meinong&#39;s Theory of Objects for reasons I may provide later.&#0160; My present point is merely that the theory cannot be faulted for a lack of ontological parsimony. A theory cannot posit entities beyond <\/span><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">necessity if it does not posit them at all.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">In his early <em>Principles of Mathematics <\/em>(1903), Bertrand Russell made a distinction that he later abandoned, namely, a distinction between Being and existence:<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">&#0160;&#0160;&#0160;&#0160; Being is that which belongs to every conceivable term, to every<\/span><br \/><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">&#0160;&#0160;&#0160;&#0160; possible object of thought &#8212; in short to everything that can<\/span><br \/><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">&#0160;&#0160;&#0160;&#0160; possibly occur in any proposition, true or false, and to all such<\/span><br \/><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">&#0160;&#0160;&#0160;&#0160; propositions themselves. [ . . . ] Existence, on the contrary, is<\/span><br \/><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">&#0160;&#0160;&#0160;&#0160; the prerogative of some only amongst beings. (p. 449)<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">But this has nothing to do with Meinong and should not be read back into Meinong. Now Meinong does distinguish between existence and subsistence (<em>Bestehen<\/em>), but the latter is the mode of Being of ideal <\/span><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">entities such as state of affairs; it has nothing to do with items like the golden mountain and the round square.<\/span><br \/><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">&#0160;<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>There is a very good and a very simple reason why Meinong cannot be accused of multiplying entities &#0160;beyond necessity, and that is because his characteristic objects are not entities! An entity, by definition, is anything that is or has being. Since Meinongian objects lack being, they are not entities. The golden mountain and the &hellip; <a href=\"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2011\/06\/02\/does-meinong-multiply-entities-beyond-necessity\/\" class=\"more-link\">Continue reading<span class=\"screen-reader-text\"> &#8220;Does Meinong Multiply Entities Beyond Necessity?&#8221;<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[482],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-10659","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-meinong-matters"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/10659","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=10659"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/10659\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=10659"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=10659"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=10659"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}