{"id":10527,"date":"2011-07-20T18:56:09","date_gmt":"2011-07-20T18:56:09","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2011\/07\/20\/the-problem-of-individuation-genine-or-pseudo\/"},"modified":"2011-07-20T18:56:09","modified_gmt":"2011-07-20T18:56:09","slug":"the-problem-of-individuation-genine-or-pseudo","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2011\/07\/20\/the-problem-of-individuation-genine-or-pseudo\/","title":{"rendered":"The Problem of Individuation: Genuine or Pseudo?"},"content":{"rendered":"<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">1. The ontological problem of individuation is actually two problems.&#0160; One is the problem of what makes two or more numerically different individuals numerically different.&#0160; What grounds numerical difference?&#0160; The other is the problem of what makes an individual an individual as opposed to a member of some other category of entity.&#0160; What grounds individuality?&#0160; If the first question is about the differentiator (the ground of numerical difference), the second is about the individuator (the ground of&#0160; individuality).&#0160;<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">The two questions are often conflated, but as you can see, they are different.&#0160; The conflation is&#0160;aided and abetted by the fact that on some theories the entity posited to do the differentiating job also does the individuating job.&#0160; For example, in Gustav Bergmann&#39;s ontology, bare particulars are both differentiators and individuators.&#0160; But if I both load the truck and drive the truck it doesn&#39;t follow that loading and driving are the same job.&#0160; So we cannot just assume that what does the differentiating job will also do the individuating job.&#0160; I won&#39;t say anything at the moment about the details of Hector-Neri Castaneda&#39;s ontology, but in it, the individuator is not a differentiator.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">Therefore, &#39;problem of individuation&#39; is a bit of a misnomer.&#0160; A better phrase would be &#39;problem(s) of individuation\/differentiation.&#39;&#0160; Having said that, I revert to the stock phrase.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">Note also that we are talking ontology here, not epistemology.&#0160; &#39;Individuate&#39; can be used in an epistemological way to mean: &#39;single out,&#39; &#39;pick out,&#39; &#39;make an identifying reference to,&#39; etc.&#0160; Suppose I single out x as the only item that has properties P, Q, R . . . .&#0160; It doesn&#39;t follow that having exactly those properties is what makes x an individual or makes x numerically different from y.&#0160; It could be like this: concrete particulars <em>a<\/em> and <em>b<\/em> are told apart by their difference is properties, but that makes them numerically different is that each&#0160;has a numerically different bare particular, or a different nonqualitative thisness, where this is not understood to be a bare particular.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">2. Before going any deeper into this&#0160;we ought&#0160;to ask&#0160;whether our two problems are genuine.&#0160;<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">Taking the first one first, why is there any need for a differentiator?&#0160; If S and P are numerically distinct concrete particulars, why not just take that as a brute fact?&#0160; Brute facts need no explaining.&#0160; That&#39;s what their bruteness consists in.&#0160; <\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">A constituent ontologist might answer as follows.&#0160; Concrete particulars have ontological consituents, among them, their properties.&#0160; Properties are universals.&#0160; It is possible that two particulars share all their properties.&#0160; Since they are not different due to a difference in properties, there must a further ontological factor that accounts for their difference.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">This sketch of an answer won&#39;t cut any ice with a certain nominalist of our acquaintance.&#0160; He will presumably deny both that concrete particulars have ontological constituents, and that there are any universals.&#0160; He may even go so far as to claim that the very idea of an ontological constituent is senseless.&#0160; He will take our first question as a pseudo-question that rests on false assumptions.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">Our nominalist will say something similar about the first question.&#0160; &#39;Only if&#0160;one starts with the assumption that individuals have ontological constituents, that among these are properties, &#0160;and that these are universals,&#0160; will one have the problem of explaining why the individual is an individual and not a collection or conjunction of universals.&#0160; The assumptions are false, so the problem is pseudo.&#39;<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>1. The ontological problem of individuation is actually two problems.&#0160; One is the problem of what makes two or more numerically different individuals numerically different.&#0160; What grounds numerical difference?&#0160; The other is the problem of what makes an individual an individual as opposed to a member of some other category of entity.&#0160; What grounds individuality?&#0160; &hellip; <a href=\"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2011\/07\/20\/the-problem-of-individuation-genine-or-pseudo\/\" class=\"more-link\">Continue reading<span class=\"screen-reader-text\"> &#8220;The Problem of Individuation: Genuine or Pseudo?&#8221;<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[487,346],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-10527","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-constituent-ontology","category-identity-and-individuation"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/10527","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=10527"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/10527\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=10527"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=10527"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=10527"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}