{"id":10445,"date":"2011-08-16T14:37:53","date_gmt":"2011-08-16T14:37:53","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2011\/08\/16\/singular-meaning\/"},"modified":"2011-08-16T14:37:53","modified_gmt":"2011-08-16T14:37:53","slug":"singular-meaning","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2011\/08\/16\/singular-meaning\/","title":{"rendered":"Singular Meaning"},"content":{"rendered":"<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">Edward Ockham of <a href=\"http:\/\/ocham.blogspot.com\/\" target=\"_self\">Beyond Necessity<\/a> is back from his Turkish holiday and reports that, besides lazing on the beach at Bodrum, he<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">. . . spent some time thinking about singular concepts. Do you accept singular meaning? Either you hold that a proper name has a meaning, or not (Aquinas held that it does not, by the way). If it does, then what is it that we understand when we understand the meaning of a proper name? The scholastics held that there was a sort of equivalence between meaning and signifying (&quot;unumquodque, sicut contingit <strong>intelligere<\/strong>, contingit et <strong>significare<\/strong>&quot;). What I signify, when I use a term in the context of a proposition, is precisely what another person understands, when he grasps that proposition that I have expressed.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">Do I accept singular meaning?&#0160; That depends on what we mean by &#39;meaning&#39; and by &#39;singular.&#39;&#0160; Let&#39;s see if we can iron out our terminology.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">1. Without taking &#39;sense&#39; and &#39;reference&#39; in exactly the way Frege intended them to be taken, I would say that &#39;meaning&#39; is ambiguous as between sense and reference.&#0160; Unfortunately, Edward seems to be using &#39;meaning&#39; to mean &#39;sense.&#39;&#0160; Of course, he is free to do that.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">2. Edward also uses the word &#39;signify.&#39;&#0160; I should like him to explain exactly&#0160; how he is using this word.&#0160; Is the signification of a proper name the same as what I am calling its sense?&#0160;Or is the signification of a proper name its &#0160;referent? Or neither? Or both? <\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">3.&#0160; Suppose I assertively utter a token of &#39;Peter is tired&#39; in the presence of both Peter and Edward.&#0160; &#0160;My assertion is intended to convey a fact about Peter to Edward.&#0160; The latter grasps (understands) the proposition I express by my assertive tokening of the sentence in question.&#0160; And of course I understand the same proposition.&#0160; What I signify &#8212; &#39;express&#39; as I would put it &#8212; by my use of &#39;Peter&#39; is what Edward understands when he grasps the proposition I express.&#0160; <\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">4.&#0160; Now the issue seems to be this.&#0160; Is the meaning or signification or sense&#0160; I express, and that I understand, &#0160;when I say &#39;Peter&#39;&#0160; a singular meaning?&#0160; More precisely: is it an <em>irreducibly<\/em> singular meaning, one that cannot be understood as logically constructed from general concepts such as<em> man<\/em>, <em>philosopher<\/em>, <em>smoker<\/em>?<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">5. I say No!&#0160;&#0160; I don&#39;t deny that &#39;Peter&#39; has a sense.&#0160; It has a sense and a referent, unlike &#39;Vulcan&#39; which has a sense but no referent.&#0160; But the sense of &#39;Peter&#39; is not singular but general.&#0160; So, to answer Edward&#39;s question, I do not accept singular meaning.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">Corollary: the haecceity of Peter &#8211; Peterity to give it a name &#8212; cannot be grasped.&#0160; All thinking is general: no thinking can penetrate to the very haecceity and ipseity of the thing thought about.&#0160; One cannot think about a particular except&#0160; as an instance of multiply exemplifiable concepts\/properties.&#0160; This is &#39;on all fours&#39; with my earlier claim that there are no singular or individual concepts.&#0160; The individual <em>qua<\/em> individual is conceptually ineffable.&#0160; So if we know singulars (individuals) at all, we do not know them by conceptualization.<\/span><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"font-family: georgia,palatino;\">If Edward disagrees with this he must tell&#0160;us exactly why.&#0160; He should also tell us exactly how he is using &#39;proposition&#39; since that is another potential bone of contention.&#0160; Is he a Fregean, a Russellian, or a Geachian when it comes to propositions?&#0160; Or none of those?<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Edward Ockham of Beyond Necessity is back from his Turkish holiday and reports that, besides lazing on the beach at Bodrum, he . . . spent some time thinking about singular concepts. Do you accept singular meaning? Either you hold that a proper name has a meaning, or not (Aquinas held that it does not, &hellip; <a href=\"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2011\/08\/16\/singular-meaning\/\" class=\"more-link\">Continue reading<span class=\"screen-reader-text\"> &#8220;Singular Meaning&#8221;<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[100,408],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-10445","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-intentionality","category-language-philosophy-of"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/10445","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=10445"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/10445\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=10445"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=10445"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=10445"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}