{"id":10427,"date":"2011-08-22T07:40:49","date_gmt":"2011-08-22T07:40:49","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2011\/08\/22\/how-many-are-the-ways-of-denying-that-intentionality-is-a-two-term-relation\/"},"modified":"2011-08-22T07:40:49","modified_gmt":"2011-08-22T07:40:49","slug":"how-many-are-the-ways-of-denying-that-intentionality-is-a-two-term-relation","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/2011\/08\/22\/how-many-are-the-ways-of-denying-that-intentionality-is-a-two-term-relation\/","title":{"rendered":"How Many are the Ways of Denying that Intentionality is a Two-Term Relation?"},"content":{"rendered":"

How shall I deny thee? Let me count the ways.<\/span><\/p>\n

I need an exhaustive classification of all the ways of denying that intentionality is a two-term relation. (Since one cannot think without thinking of something, one might suppose that intentionality is a dyadic relation connecting a thinker or one of his mental contents to an object.)  Here is what I have come up with so far.  If you know this subject and think that there is a way I have overlooked, the ComBox is open for you to tell me what it is.<\/span><\/p>\n

1. There is no intentionality at all.  If there is no intentionality, then intentionality is not a relation between a subjective item and an objective item.  This eliminativist option is of course a complete nonstarter.  <\/span><\/p>\n

2. Intentionality is sui generis<\/em>.  On this view there are relations, but intentionality is wholly unique and so not a member of the category of relations.  At most, intentionality is relation-like.  One can find something like this view in Brentano and Findlay.<\/span><\/p>\n

3. Intentionality is not a relation because there are no relations.  For Bradley, there are, in ultimate reality, no relations.  So a Bradleyan might argue that whatever intentionality is, it cannot be a relation.<\/span><\/p>\n

4. Intentionality is not a dyadic relation; it is a monadic property of objects. (Sartre, Butchvarov, et al.) <\/span><\/p>\n

5.  Intentionality is not a relation because it is either an adverbial modification of subjects, or a property of subjects (Bergmann, Addis).<\/span><\/p>\n

6.  Intentionality is not a two-term<\/em> relation (though it is a two-place<\/em> relation); it involves an identity between subject and object. (Thomism)  To see how this might work, see here <\/a>and here<\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

7.  Intentionality is a not a two<\/em>-term relation because it is a multiple-term relation along the lines of Russell's multiple-relation theory of judgment.  The idea here is that there is no one thing on the side of the object, no proposition or fact.  Accordingly, Othello's believing that Desdemona loves Cassio is not a two-term relation between Othello and the proposition that Desdemona loves Cassio; it is a four-place relation that can be depicted by 'Believes(Othello, Desdemona, loves, Cassio).'<\/span><\/p>\n

Did I cover all the bases?  Is my classification exhaustive?<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

How shall I deny thee? Let me count the ways. I need an exhaustive classification of all the ways of denying that intentionality is a two-term relation. (Since one cannot think without thinking of something, one might suppose that intentionality is a dyadic relation connecting a thinker or one of his mental contents to an object.)  … Continue reading “How Many are the Ways of Denying that Intentionality is a Two-Term Relation?”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[100],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-10427","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-intentionality"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/10427","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=10427"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/10427\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=10427"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=10427"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/maverickphilosopher.blog\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=10427"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}