Why AI Systems Cannot be Conscious

1) To be able to maintain that AI systems are literally conscious in the way we are, conscious states must be multiply realizable. Consider a cognitive state such as knowing that 7 is a prime number. That state is realizable in the wetware of human brains. The question is whether the same type of state could be realized in the hardware of a computing machine. Keep in mind the type-token distinction. The realization of the state in question (knowing that 7 is prime) is its tokening in brain matter in the one instance, in silica-based matter in the other. This is not possible without multiple realizability of one and the same type of mental state.

2) Conscious states (mental states) are multiply realizable only if functionalism is true. This is obvious, is it not?

3) Functionalism is incoherent.

Therefore:

4) AI systems cannot be literally conscious in the way we are.

That's the argument.  The premise that needs defending is (3).  So let's get to it.

Suppose Socrates Jones is in some such state as that of perceiving a tree. The state is classifiable as mental as opposed to a physical state like that of his lying beneath a tree. What makes a mental state mental? That is the question.

The functionalist answer is that what makes a mental state mental is just the causal role it plays in mediating between the sensory inputs, behavioral outputs, and other internal states of the subject in question. The idea is not the banality that mental states typically (or even always) have causes and effects, but that it is causal role occupancy, nothing more and nothing less, that constitutes the mentality of a mental state. The intrinsic nature of what plays the role is relevant only to its fitness for instantiating mental causal  roles, but not at all relevant to its being a mental state.

Consider a piston in an engine. You can't make a piston out of chewing gum, but being made of steel is no part of what makes a piston a piston. A piston is what it does within the 'economy' of the engine. Similarly, on functionalism, a mental state is what it does. This allows, but does not entail, that a mental state be a brain or CNS state. It also allows, but does not entail, that a mental state be a state of a  computing machine.

To illustrate, suppose my cat Zeno and I are startled out of our respective reveries by a loud noise at time t. Given the differences  between human and feline brains, presumably man and cat are not in type-identical brain states at t.  (One of the motivations for functionalism was the breakdown of the old type-type identity theory of Herbert Feigl, U. T. Place. J. J. C. Smart, et al.)  Yet both man and cat are startled: both are in some sense in the same mental state, even though the states they are in are neither token- nor type-identical. The  functionalist will hold that we are in functionally the same mental state in virtue of the fact that Zeno's brain state plays the same  role in him as my brain state plays in me. It does the same  mediatorial job vis-à-vis sensory inputs, other internal states, and  behavioral outputs in me as the cat's brain state does in him.

On functionalism, then, the mentality of the mental is wholly relational. And as David Armstrong points out, "If the essence of the mental is purely relational, purely a matter of what causal role is played, then the logical possibility remains that whatever in fact plays the causal role is not material." This implies that "Mental states might be states of a spiritual substance." Thus the very feature of functionalism that allows mentality to be realized in computers and nonhuman brains generally, also allows it to be realized in spiritual substances if there are any.

Whether this latitudinarianism is thought to be good or bad, functionalism is a monumentally implausible theory of mind. There are the technical objections that have spawned a pelagic literature: absent qualia, inverted qualia, the 'Chinese nation,' etc. Thrusting these aside, I go for the throat, Searle-style. 

Functionalism is threatened by a fundamental incoherence. The theory states that what makes a state mental is nothing intrinsic to the state, but purely relational: a matter of its causes and effects. In us, these happen to be neural. (I am assuming physicalism for the time being.)  Now every mental state is a neural state, but not every neural state is a mental state. So the distinction between mental and nonmental neural states must be accounted for in terms of a distinction between two different sets of causes and effects, those that contribute to mentality and those that do not. But how make this distinction? How do the causes/effects of mental neural events differ from the causes/effects of nonmental neural events? Equivalently, how do psychologically salient input/output events differ from those that lack such salience?

Suppose the display on my monitor is too bright for comfort and I decide to do something about it. Why is it that photons entering my retina are psychologically salient inputs but those striking the back of my head are not? Why is it that the moving of my hand to to adjust the brightness and contrast controls is a salient output event, while unnoticed perspiration is not?

One may be tempted to say that the psychologically salient inputs are those that contribute to the production of the uncomfortable glare sensation, and the psychologically salient outputs are those that manifest the concomitant intention to make an adjustment. But then the salient input/output events are being picked out by reference to mental events taken precisely NOT as causal role occupants, but as exhibiting intrinsic features that are neither causal nor neural: the glare quale has an intrinsic nature that cannot be resolved into relations to other items, and cannot be identified with any brain state. The functionalist would then be invoking the very thing he is at pains to deny, namely, mental events as having more than neural and causal features.

Clearly, one moves in a circle of embarrassingly short diameter if one says: (i) mental events are mental because of the mental causal roles they play; and (ii) mental causal roles are those whose occupants are mental events.

The failure of functionalism is particularly evident in the case of qualia.  Examples of qualia: felt pain, a twinge of nostalgia, the smell of burnt garlic, the taste of avocado.  Is it plausible to say that such qualia can be exhaustively factored into a neural component and a causal/functional component?  It is the exact opposite of plausible.  It is not as loony as the eliminativist denial of qualia, but it is close.  The intrinsic nature of qualitative mental states is essential to them. It is that intrinsic qualitative nature that dooms functionalism.

Therefore

4) It cannot be maintained with truth that AI systems are literally conscious in the way we are. Talk of computers knowing this or that is metaphorical.

Naomi Wolf on Zohran Mamdani

Naomi Wolf feels 

. . . guilty because my reaction to Mamdani is so personally aversive.

It is aversive because of the lie-and-deception factor.

Mamdani, as I will reveal, is a nepo son dressed as a communist — but a communist takeover of NYC is not what really motivates this man, not what is really behind this campaign.

Apart from the full-spectrum communist agenda which Mamdani superficially offers, one reason for my sense of personal queasiness when I consider this candidate in various settings is because I know guys like this. Though I am of another generation, some things do not change.

I went to school with guys like this. They are Jaspers.

Read it all.

Filed under: Hustlers, Frauds, Mountebanks

Mind-Body Dualism in Aquinas and Descartes: How Do They Differ?

Thomas Aquinas, following Aristotle, views the soul as the form of the body. Anima forma corporis. Roughly, soul is to body as form is to matter. So to understand the soul-body relation, we must first understand the form-matter relation.  Henry Veatch points out that "Matter and form are not beings so much as they are principles of being." (Henry B. Veatch, "To Gustav Bergmann: A Humble Petition and Advice" in M. S. Gram and E. D. Klemke, eds. The Ontological Turn: Studies in the Philosophy of Gustav Bergmann , University of Iowa Press, 1974, pp. 65-85, p. 80)  'Principles' in this scholastic usage are not  propositions.  They are ontological factors (as I would put it) invoked in the analysis of primary substances, but they are not themselves primary substances. They cannot exist on their own.  Let me explain.

Remember When Cuellar was Carjacked?

This jack was a while back.  Yet another proof of how safe Washington, D.C. was and still is.  Henry Cuellar is a Democrat. Democrats are leftists. Leftists have an exceedingly casual attitude toward criminal behavior. It's really no big deal to them. Cuellar's main complaint? "They stole my sushi."

If, for whatever reason, you like crime, then I advise you to vote Democrat early and often.

Blue cities are crime-ridden. It makes them interesting places to live.  Full of excitement and local color.   (I know what you are thinking: 'local color' is a racist code-phrase, a 'dog whistle.'  It's not. Look it up.)

Here's an NYC case you have probably forgotten. Leftist activist and do-gooder Ryan Carson was stabbed to death in front of his girlfriend in an apparently unprovoked attack.  Carson was the victim of the very 'progressive' policies that he himself promoted. So he must bear some responsibility for bringing about his own death. And what was Carson doing out at night on the mean streets of NYC without a weapon? 

Cases like this are increasingly common.  Unless you are morally obtuse, you will understand why justice demands capital punishment in such cases. That 'progressives' oppose the death penalty is proof positive that they have a casual attitude toward criminal behavior.  

Democrats are astonishingly stupid people. They supposedly want fewer guns in civilian hands. So what do they do? They promote policies that incentivize concealed carry! There is no common sense on the Left. 

I too want fewer guns in civilian hands. When laws are enforced, civilians will feel safe and won't feel the need to look to their own defense.  

Cuellar case here.

Here you can read about how safe D. C. is.

Who’s Hell Bound?

Just over the transom from Derwood:

Help me understand something. When Jesus died, the vast percentage of humanity had and would never hear of the Jewish messiah/god.
True.  And that would seem to include all sorts of righteous Old Testament individuals, including Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob.  Surely, the latter three are not in hell. As I understand traditional RCC theology, Abraham & Co. upon their deaths were sent to the "limbo of the fathers" (limbus patrum), a 'place' distinct from both hell and purgatory wherein the Old Testament righteous enjoyed a natural happiness, but did not partake of the Beatific Vision (visio beata).  This, I take it, is the 'place' Christ visited after his crucifixion when he "descended into hell' (as we read in the NT) before rising on the third day.  He went there to release the OT saints from their 'holding pen' and bring them to the Father in heaven.  It follows that the hell into which Christ descended is not hell as a 'place' of everlasting/eternal damnation and torment. 
Does that mean that the vast majority of humanity, men, women and children, were hell-bound heathens?
The problem of unbaptized children motivated a nuancing of the limbo concept by Albertus Magnus: there is not only the limbus patrum but also the limbus infantium/limbus puerorum, the limbo of children.  Surely a just and benevolent deity would not send them to hell, sensu stricto.
How does a just and benevolent deity allow that? That persists today, doesn't it? How much of the world knows about, much less worships, Jesus? All hell-bound?
The topic of limbo is not currently discussed.  If I'm not mistaken, the 1992 RCC catechism makes no reference to it. Theology ain't what it used to be  What a degeneration from Ratzinger to Bergoglio! The German has a first-rate theological head. I recommend his books.  It should noted, however, that Ratzinger (Pope Benedict XVI) considered limbo a doctrine it was not necessary for a Catholic to believe. See our friend Michael Liccione's First Things article on the topic, A Doctrine in Limbo.
 
I am just scratching the surface, and in any case I am not a theologian.  This fact does not dissuade me from 'pontificating' on this and plenty of other theological matters! Here are three good sources for anyone interested in this topic: an article from The Thomist; a Britannica article; and one from the Catholic Encyclopedia. 
 
At some point I want to discuss purgatory.  Calvin rejects the notion. Surely that is a theological error of major proportions! (I'm baiting my Calvinist friends.)

Gerrymandering: the Latest Leftist Double Standard

Would anything be left of the Left if the bums were divested of all their double standards?  The latest example is gerrymandering. It's OK for them but not for us.

As Vice President J.D. Vance noted in a recent interview on Fox News, Democrats “have fought very dirty for a very long time” and “have tried to rig the game … against Republicans.” Under Trump’s leadership, “you finally see some backbone in the Republican party to fight back against these very aggressive Democratic dirty tricks” like aggressive gerrymandering, he continued. However, the only way to do that is to “reset the scales a little bit.”

“What we want to do is redo the census, but, importantly, we want to redistrict some of these red states. And we want to make the congressional apportionment fair in this country. Again, you cannot do it unless Republicans actually take some very decisive action in the months to come,” Vance said.

Albert King complained that "if it wasn't for bad luck, I'd have no luck at all." But I say unto you: if weren't for double standards, our leftist pals would have no standards at all. Am I exaggerating? By how much, exactly?

The Sam Tanenhaus Biography of William F. Buckley

I came across it at the local library but the sheer weight of the thing dissuaded me from checking it out.  I borrowed  Jake Tapper's light-weight (in both senses) Original Sin instead. I cannot recommend it. William Voegli's review of Tanenhaus, William F. Buckley and the Conservative Future, I can recommend.  It raises the question: Is Donald Trump the political heir of National Review's founder?

Here are its final paragraphs. The bolded portions earn the coveted MavPhil plenary endorsement.

The relationship between Buckley and Trump is also contested among conservatives. For critics like Brookhiser and Will, Trump’s coarse manner is inseparable from the coarseness of his politics. Conservatism, they argue, must be reclaimed by men of character and intellect, like Buckley and Reagan. In his review of Buckley, Brookhiser calls Trump a “malignant clown,” whose prominence within conservatism is “our problem,” not Buckley’s fault.

There appears to be no clear solution to this problem, as restoring conservatism to its status quo ante-Trump grows increasingly implausible. And the awkward fact is that Trump, over one full term and the beginnings of another, has delivered on goals that conservatives had spent generations trying to achieve.

Consider affirmative action. Since Lyndon Johnson’s 1965 executive order made it integral to federal operations, six Republican presidents—Trump (as 45) among them—held the Oval Office for a combined 32 years without rescinding it, despite a steady drumbeat of conservative criticism. In 2025, Trump (as 47) finally signed an executive order nullifying Johnson’s. His action built on the Supreme Court’s 2022 decision declaring affirmative action unconstitutional in college admissions—a decision made possible by the three justices Trump appointed in his first term.

Those same three were part of the six-justice majority that year to overturn Roe v. Wade, which conservatives had denounced for nearly half a century with little effect. And while the game is not over, it exactly wrong in The Death of Conservatism. The good conservatives are the troublemakers: those who do not accept that it is indecent to disparage and impossible to reverse liberalism’s advances. The bad conservatives are the acquiescent ones, Goldberg’s Sherpas or Michael Anton’s Washington Generals, whose role in our politics is “to show up and lose.”

Trump 47 has already done more to defund public broadcasting and the Department of Education than any of his Republican predecessors—not to mention the conservative commentators who spent decades demanding just that.

The growing number of conservatives who are pro-Trump, or at least Trump-tolerant, think that Tanenhaus got it exactly wrong in The Death of Conservatism. The good conservatives are the troublemakers: those who do not accept that it is indecent to disparage and impossible to reverse liberalism’s advances. The bad conservatives are the acquiescent ones, Goldberg’s Sherpas or Michael Anton’s Washington Generals, whose role in our politics is “to show up and lose.”

In 1955, William F. Buckley launched National Review—and the conservative movement—with the famous declaration that the magazine “stands athwart history, yelling Stop.” Within conservatism, there has long been debate over whether the yelling is the point, decrying the demise of civic and social virtues too good to endure in this benighted world, or whether the real goal is to effect some stopping. Due to changes that Donald Trump both causes and reflects, the stoppers are now ascendant over the yellers. While Sam Tanenhaus disapproves of this shift, his imperfect but valuable biography does little to dispel the suspicion that William Buckley would have welcomed it.  

Spread Mind

Reader Matteo sends us here, where we read:

So let me tell you why the Spread Mind promises to solve one of the most difficult problems in the history of science and philosophy.

First, allow me to be clear about the terminology. First, all my efforts are based on a straightforward empirical hypothesis, the so called Mind-Object Identity hypothesis (MOI), namely the hypothesis that

The experience of X is one and the same as X

This should not come as a surprise to anybody. If our conscious experience is real, it must be something! And since the world is made only of physical stuff, there has to be something physical that is one and the same as our experience. I know, I know, many people have been looking for consciousness inside the brain. Have they succeeded? No. So let’s start looking for consciousness elsewhere. Where? In the very external objects around our body.

At this point I stopped reading. (Well, I did skim the rest, but it got no better.)

Yes, conscious experience is real. My present visual experiencing of a tree (or as of a tree to be precise) is undoubtedly real. And so the experiencing is, not just something, but something that exists. What the experiencing is of or about is, let us assume, also real.  Now we cannot just assume that "the world is made up only of physical stuff," but suppose that that is true. Still, the act and its object are two, not one: the experiencing and the tree experienced cannot be numerically identical even if both are physical. 

On the face of it, then, MOI is simply absurd.

This quickie response does not, of course, put paid to every theory of extended mind.

Am I being fair, Matteo?

Edith Stein: Faith, Reason, and Method

August 9th is the feast day of St. Theresa Benedicta of the Cross in the Catholic liturgy.  She is better known to philosophers as Edith Stein (1891-1942), brilliant Jewish student of and assistant to Edmund Husserl, philosopher in her own right, Roman Catholic convert, Carmelite nun, victim of the Holocaust at Auschwitz, and saint of the Roman Catholic Church. One best honors a philosopher by re-enacting his thoughts, sympathetically but critically. Herewith, a bit of critical re-enactment.

In the 1920s Stein composed an imaginary dialogue between her two philosophical masters, Edmund Husserl and Thomas Aquinas. Part of what she has them discussing is the nature of faith.

Read the rest at Substack.

The piece concludes:

So there you have it. There are two opposing conceptions of philosophy, one based on the autonomy of reason, and with it the exclusively internal validation of all knowledge claims, the other willing to sacrifice the autonomy of reason for the sake of truths which cannot be certified by reason or subjectively validated but which are provided by faith in revelation, a revelation that must simply be accepted in humility and obedience. It looks as if one must simply decide which of these two conceptions to adopt, and accept that the decision cannot be justified by (natural) reason.

Addenda (8/9/2025)

  • I say above that there are two opposing conceptions of philosophy, but is that right? Perhaps not. It might be closer to the truth to say that philosophy by its very nature rests on the autonomy of reason, and that the  "other conception" is not philosophy sensu stricto but a worldview. If so, any view according to which "faith is its own guarantee" is not philosophy or a philosophy, but beyond philosophy.
  • Thomas wears at least four 'hats.' He is a philosopher, a Christian, a Christian theologian, and a mystic.  You could be any one of these without being any one of the others. He plays the philosopher in the praeambula fidei of the Summa Theologica wherein he attempts to demonstrate the existence of God in his quinque viae or Five Ways.  These proofs make no appeal to divine revelation via Scripture nor do they rest on the personal deliverances of mystical experience. They proceed by discursive reason alone on the basis of sense experience.
  • So you could say to me that Thomas's theistic worldview is not beyond philosophy inasmuch as the philosophy of the praeambula is an integral part of his defense of the Christian worldview. My response will be that the Five Ways do not conclusively prove the existence of God, let alone provide any support for such specifically Christian doctrines as Trinity and Incarnation (which of course they were not intended to do). So in the end, a will-driven leap of faith is required to arrive at Thomas's theistic worldview. So at best, the Five Ways are arguments (not proofs) that render rationally acceptable Christian belief.  Rationally acceptable, but not rationally mandatory. In the end you must decide what to believe and how you will live. My concluding sentence, "the decision cannot be justified by (natural) reason" is not quite right. I should have written: the decision to accept the Christian worldview, while neither it, nor the generic theism at its base, can be proven from natural reason operating upon the deliverances of the sense, can nonetheless be rendered rationally acceptable.
  • "Go ahead, believe!" Thus spoke Wittgenstein. "What harm can it do?" I add: you won't be flouting any canons of rationality.

The Theological Virtue of Hope

RCC Catechism: 

1817. Hope is the theological virtue by which we desire the kingdom of heaven and eternal life as our happiness, placing our trust in Christ's promises and relying not on our own strength, but on the help of the grace of the Holy Spirit.

Now listen to Pope Leo:

The pontiff [Leo] said that the Jubilee Year of Hope “encourages the universal Church and indeed the entire world to reflect on this essential virtue, which Pope Francis described as the desire and expectation of good things to come despite or not knowing what the future may bring.”

I am no theologian, but Pope Francis's description of the theological virtue of hope leaves something to be desired. Compare it to the quotation immediately preceding. Is Leo, who seems to be uncritically accepting Francis's description, much of an improvement over his predecessor?

Papyrology and AI: the Library at Herculaneum

How much of a curse and how much of a blessing  Artificial Intelligence will prove to be remains to be seen. Book this on the blessing side of the ledger:

The University of Kentucky (UKY) has announced it is a co-recipient of a $13.5 million (€11.5 million) grant from the European Research Council in support of an international effort to decipher ancient papyrus scrolls carbonized and buried by the eruption of Mount Vesuvius in 79 CE.

[. . .]

The award will enable the consortium to scale its efforts over the next six years to digitally recover, analyze, and read text from hundreds of papyrus scrolls that have until now been undecipherable. In addition, the project will leverage AI to connect pieces of scrolls, find patterns in how the library at Herculaneum was organized, and help establish best practices to preserve the collection. The project may uncover as much as 4.5 million words of entirely new Greek and Latin literature.