Maverick Philosopher

Footnotes to Plato from the foothills of the Superstition Mountains

  • AI, Intellectual Theft, and Lawsuits

    A year or two ago I was bumping along at about one thousand page views per diem when I experienced an unusual uptick in traffic. Inspection of the MavPhil traffic log suggested that my content was being stolen. But I didn't much care, and I still don't much care inasmuch as my content has very little commercial value, and in any case, I'm a "made man" with more than enough loot to see me through my remaining sublunary travels and travails. My thinking and writing is a labor love and not a money-making enterprise. Add to that the fact that I'm an Enough is Enough kind of guy who has no interest in piling up the lean green far in excess of what is needed.  And maybe I'm steering Group Mind or Objektiver Geist in a wholesome direction. I'm doing my bit, like a good Boomer, to make this world a better place. 

    But what if you make your living by scribbling? What if you have a 'high maintenance' wife, children, a hefty mortgage and you live in a high-tax lefty locale? Interesting questions here.  More grist for the mill.

    And so I tip my  hat to Ingvarius Maximus the Alhambran for sending us to  this Washington (Com)Post article actually worth reading. Access is free. (What fool pays for access to such a crappy publication?)

    One more thing. When lawyers are replaced by AI systems will AI systems be suing AI systems over intellectual property theft? 

    Bill Vallicella

    4 responses to “AI, Intellectual Theft, and Lawsuits”

  • Why Do We Support Trump?

    Charlie Kirk, six months in to the second Trump term, sets forth what sets Trump 2.0 apart.  His astonishing accomplishments include, in Kirk's words:

    1) Completely and instantly securing the U.S.-Mexico border after the four-year Biden invasion. 

    2) The stock market hit record highs this very week and blue-collar wages are rising faster than they have in 60 years.

    3) Striking a crippling blow to Iran’s nuclear program while suffering zero casualties and even bringing a ceasefire between Iran and Israel as part of the bargain.

    4) Doing things that past Republicans could and should have done, yet inexplicably never did. For instance, restoring merit-based hiring;  toppling the race and sex-based discrimination that had taken root all over America in flagrant defiance of both our Constitution and historic American values;  purging DEI commissars from federal agencies, imposing uniform standards on the military, and sending out warnings to the private sector as well; the destruction in detail of a rotten, anti-American ideology.

    5) Doing the work necessary to protect American children from the transgender mania, one of the great evils of our time.

    6) Ending health care providers'  involvement in child mutilation and similar treatments.

    7) Cutting USAID down to size and keeping more of America’s money in America. The same goes for defunding NPR, PBS, and Planned Parenthood.

    8) TSA’s policy requiring passengers to remove their shoes before boarding a flight was a pointless bit of security theater, yet Presidents Bush, Obama, and Biden all kept the policy around anyway. This administration finally got rid of it.

    9) While the Biden administration treated the cryptocurrency industry as a borderline criminal enterprise, Trump signed the GENIUS Act, which positions America to be at the lead of this innovative industry.

    Decisive action, not empty talk. Promises made, promises kept. But now let me add one of my own:

    10) Destroying the Dems by driving them leftward — and crazy. He does it by co-opting their themes and concerns. He actually does what they only talked about doing.  Traditionally, they were supposed to be for the workers, and in some measure they were long ago. Trump is now and in actuality for the workers, American workers, not "the workers of the world."  He has transformed the Republican Party into the party of peace, the people, and prosperity.  The Dems respond by moving farther and farther left and embracing more and more extreme candidates, the Islamo-Commie Mamdani being their latest savior.  (Remember when Obama was their 'savior'?)

    Hunter Biden, recently in full melt-down F-bomber mode, may be their next pick for 2028. Let's hope so!

    Bill Vallicella

    4 responses to “Why Do We Support Trump?”

  • AI and the Unity of Consciousness

    Top AI researchers such as Geoffrey Hinton, the "Godfather of AI,"  hold that advanced AI systems are conscious.  That is far from obvious, and may even be demonstrably false if we consider the phenomenon of the unity of consciousness.  I will first explain the phenomenon in question, and then conclude that AI systems cannot accommodate it.

    Diachronic Unity of Consciousness, Example One

    Suppose my mental state passes from one that is pleasurable to one that is painful.  Observing a beautiful Arizona sunset, my reverie is suddenly broken by the piercing noise of a smoke detector.  Not only is the painful state painful, the transition from the pleasurable state to the painful one is itself painful.  The fact that the transition is painful shows that it is directly perceived. It is not as if there is merely a succession of consciousnesses (conscious states), one pleasurable the other painful; there is in addition a consciousness of their succession.  For there is a consciousness of the transition from the pleasant state to the painful state, a consciousness that embraces both of the states, and so cannot be reductively analyzed into them.  But a consciousness of their succession is a consciousness of their succession in one subject, in one unity of consciousness.  It is a consciousness of the numerical identity of the self through the transition from the pleasurable state to the painful one.  Passing from a pleasurable state to a painful one, there is not only an awareness of a pleasant state followed by an awareness of a painful one, but also an awareness that the one who was in a pleasurable state is strictly and numerically the same as the one who is now in a painful state.  This sameness is phenomenologically given, although our access to this phenomenon is easily blocked by inappropriate models taken from the physical world.  Without the consciousness of sameness, there would be no consciousness of transition.

    What this phenomenological argument shows is that the self cannot be a mere diachronic bundle or collection of states.  The self is a transtemporal unity distinct from its states whether these states are taken distributively (one by one) or collectively (all together).

    May we conclude from the phenomenology of the situation that there is a simple, immaterial, meta-physical substance that each one of us is and that is the ontological support of the phenomenologically given unity of consciousness?  May we make the old-time school-metaphysical moves from the simplicity of this soul substance to it immortality? Maybe not! This is a further step that needs to be carefully considered. I don't rule it out, but I also don't rule it in. I don't need to take the further step for my present purpose, which is merely to show that a computing machine, no matter how complex or how fast its processing, cannot be conscious.  No material system can be conscious.  For the moment I content myself with the negative claim: no material system can be conscious. It follows straightaway that no AI system can be conscious.

    Diachronic Unity of Consciousness, Example Two

    Another example is provided by the hearing of a melody.  To hear the melody Do-Re-Mi, it does not suffice that there be a hearing of Do, followed by a hearing of Re, followed by a hearing of Mi.  For those three acts of hearing could occur in that sequence in three distinct subjects, in which case they would not add up to the hearing of a melody.  (Tom, Dick, and Harry can divide up the task of loading a truck, but not the ‘task’ of hearing a melody, or that of understanding a sentence.)  But now suppose the acts of hearing occur in the same subject, but that this subject is not a unitary and self-same individual but just the bundle of these three acts, call them A1, A2, and A3.  When A1 ceases, A2 begins, and when A2 ceases, A3 begins: they do not overlap.  In which act is the hearing of the melody?  A3 is the only likely candidate, but surely it cannot be a hearing of the melody.

    This is because the awareness of a melody involves the awareness of the (musical not temporal)  intervals between the notes, and to apprehend these intervals there must be a retention (to use Husserl’s term) in the present act A3 of the past acts A2 and A1.  Without this phenomenological presence of the past acts in the present act, there would be no awareness in the present of the melody.  This implies that the self cannot be a mere bundle of perceptions externally related to each other, but must be a peculiarly intimate unity of perceptions in which the present perception A3 includes the immediately past ones A2 and A1 as temporally past but also as phenomenologically present in the mode of retention.  The fact that we hear melodies thus shows that there must be a self-same and unitary self through the period of time between the onset of the melody and its completion.  This unitary self is neither identical to the sum or collection of A1, A2, and A3, nor is it identical to something wholly distinct from them.  Nor of course is it identical to any one of them or any two of them.  This unitary self is co-given whenever one hears a melody.  (This seems to imply that all consciousness is at least implicitly self-consciousness. This is a topic for a later post.)

    Diachronic -Synchronic Unity of Consciousness

    Now consider a more complicated example in which I hear two chords, one after the other, the first major, the second minor.   I hear the major chord C-E-G, and then I hear the minor chord C-E flat-G.  But I also hear the difference between them.   How is the awareness of the major-minor difference possible? One condition of this possibility is the diachronic unity of consciousness. But there is also a second condition. The hearing of the major chord as major cannot be analyzed without remainder into an act of hearing C, an act of hearing E, and an act of hearing G, even when all occur simultaneously.  For to hear the three notes as a major chord, I must apprehend the 1-3-5 musical interval that they instantiate.  But this is possible only because the whole of my present consciousness is more than the sum of its parts.  This whole is no doubt made up of the part-consciousnesses, but it is not exhausted by them.  For it is also a consciousness of the relatedness of the notes.  But this consciousness of relatedness is not something in addition to the other acts of consciousness: it includes them and embraces them without being reducible to them.  So here we have an example of the diachronic-synchronic unity of consciousness.

    These considerations appear to put paid to the conceit that AI systems can be conscious.

    Or have I gone too far? You've heard me say that in philosophy there are few if any rationally compelling,  ineluctably decisive, arguments for substantive theses.  Are the above arguments among the few? Further questions obtrude themselves, for example, "What do you mean by 'material system'?"  "Could a panpsychist uphold the consciousness of advanced AI systems?"

    Vita brevis, philosophia longa.

    Bill Vallicella

    6 responses to “AI and the Unity of Consciousness”

  • Ernst Bloch on Law and the State

    Substack latest.

    We humans are hopeful. Ernst Bloch was on to something. But man on his own is without reasonable hope. We are reduced to praying.

    The above thought occurred to me during the penumbral twilight period betwixt sleeping and waking.

    Bill Vallicella

    5 responses to “Ernst Bloch on Law and the State”

  • Hungry Tuxies Break their Fast

     

    Cats break fast

    Bill Vallicella

  • Can an AI System Meditate?

    Resolute meditators on occasion experience a deep inner quiet. It is a definite state of consciousness. You will know it if you experience it, but destroy it if you try to analyze it.  If you have the good fortune to be vouchsafed such a state of awareness you must humbly accept it and not reflect upon it nor ask questions about it, such as: How did I arrive at this blissful state of mind? How can I repeat this experience?  You must simply rest in the experience. Become as a little child and accept the gift with gratitude. One-pointedness is destroyed by analysis. 

    Mental quiet is a state in which the "mind works" have temporarily shut down in the sense that discursive operations (conceptualizing, judging, reasoning) have ceased, and there is no inner processing of data or computation.  You have achieved a deep level of conscious unity prior to and deeper than anything pieced together from parts. You are not asleep or dead but more fully alive. You are approaching the source of thoughts, which is not and cannot be a thought.  Crude analogy: the source of a stream is not itself a stream.  Less crude, but still an analogy: the unity of a proposition is not itself a proposition, or the proposition of which it is the unity, or a sub-proposititional constituent of the proposition.

    Can a computing machine achieve the blissful state of inner quiet? You can 'pull the plug' on it in which case it would 'go dark.'  The machine is either on or off (if it is 'asleep' it is still on).   But when the meditator touches upon inner quiet, he has not gone dark, but entered a light transcendentally prior to the objects of ordinary (discursive) mind.

    I would replace the lyric, "Turn off your mind, relax, and float downstream; it is not dying, it is not dying" with "Turn off your discursive mind and swim upstream; it is not dying; it is not dying." "That you may see the meaning of Within."

    Can an AI system achieve mental quiet, the first step on the mystical ascent? Cognate questions: Could such a system realize the identity of Atman and Brahman or enjoy the ultimate felicity of the Beatific Vision?  Is ultimate enlightenment reachable by an increase is processing speed? You are aware, aren't you, that processing speed is increasing exponentially. 

    The answer to these questions, of course, is No.  When a computer stops computing it ceases to function as it must function to be what it is.  But when we halt our discursive operations, however, we touch upon our true selves.

    Bill Vallicella

    8 responses to “Can an AI System Meditate?”

  • Saturday Night at the Oldies: Some Performers Who Ditched Their Italian Surnames

    But before getting on to the greaseball crooners, a bit of R & R history.  The 5th of July, 2025, is the 71st anniversary of the recording of Elvis Presley's That's Alright, Mama, his first commercial record.  It was written and first recorded by Arthur 'Big Boy' Crudup in 1946.  Some say that Presley's recording is the first rock and roll record.  Others give the palm to the 1951 Rocket 88 by Jackie Brenston and his Delta Cats.  The associated video features footage (and 'leggage') of Bettie Page, that innocent  and unwitting sex kitten of the '50s. She got religion big time later on, as did Dion DiMucci, but that's another and another Saturday Night at the Oldies . . . .

    …………..

    Before Bobby Darin became Bobby Darin he rejoiced under the name, Walden Robert Cassotto.  Dream Lover.  18 Yellow Roses. You're the Reason I'm Living.

    Bobby Rydell started out Robert Ridarelli.  Forget him.  Volare, 1960. "Letsa fly . . . ." Wild One. We Got Love,

    No, his name wasn't Dino Martino, it was Dino Paul Crocetti.  Schmaltzy as it is, That's Amore captures the Nagelian what-it's-like of being in love.  Houston.

    Concetta Rosa Maria Franconero, better known as Connie Francis. My Darling Clementine. Never on Sunday.    My favorite version is by Melina Mercouri. Now check out the great Anthony Quinn in Zorba the Greek. Connie Francis died two days ago at 87.

    Timoteo Aurro = Timi Yuro.  When I first heard her back in the day, I thought she was black.  What a voice!  What's the Matter, Baby?  Her signature number: Hurt, 1962.

    Laura traded in 'Nigro' for 'Nyro.'  Wedding Bell Blues.   And When I Die.  These go out to Monterey Tom, big L.N. fan.  Nyro died young in 1997 of ovarian cancer, 49 years of age.

    Bill Vallicella

  • NPR and PBS Finally Defunded

    This is great news, and we have Trump to thank for this and for so many other things. In May of this year, I wrote over at Substack:

    If you like NPR programming, write them a check! Just don't demand that they receive taxpayer support. We are in fiscal crisis, and budgetary cuts must be made. If such inessentials as NPR and PBS cannot be defunded, which programs can be defunded?

    Some think that a refusal of sponsorship amounts to censorship. But that is foolishness pure and simple and duly refuted here.

    So one reason to defund NPR is that we cannot afford it. But there is a much better reason.

    Even if we could afford it, NPR in its present configuration should not receive Federal support. And this for the simple reason that it is plainly a propaganda arm of the Left.* If you deny the increasingly leftward tilt of NPR, even unto 'wokery,' then you are delusional and not worth talking to. So I'll charitably assume that you are sane and admit the bias. The next question I will put to you is whether you think it is morally right that tax dollars be used to push points of view and policies that half if not most of us in this land find deeply objectionable on moral grounds such as the policy of allowing biological males to compete in women’s sporting events. I say that it it is not morally right that the government take our money by force and then use it for a purpose that is not only inessential and unconnected to the necessary functions of government, but also violates our beliefs.

    So that is my second reason for defunding NPR.

    Perhaps, if NPR were balanced like C-SPAN, it could be tolerated in times of plenty. But we are not in times of plenty and it is not balanced.

    Note that a reasonable liberal could accept my two reasons. But contemporary liberals are not particularly liberal in the classical sense, and the Democrat Party has been hijacked by the Left. I am not arguing that the federal government must not engage in any projects other than those that are strictly essential such as those connected with the protection of life, liberty, and property (the Lockean triad). I am arguing that present fiscal facts and facts pertaining to NPR content dictate that defunding NPR is something that ought to be done.

    Finally, you may enjoy watching the current NPR boss squirm and back track in the teeth of Congressional grilling.

    _________________

    *I stand not only for the separation of church and state, but also for the separation of leftism and state. Leftocracy is as antithetical to the founding principles of our constitutionally-based republic as is theocracy.

    Bill Vallicella

    One response to “NPR and PBS Finally Defunded”

  • Epstein and Trump: Nothing to See Here

    Alan Dershowitz:

    Open records show an acquaintance between Epstein and Mr. Trump many years ago. That relationship ended when Mr. Trump reportedly banned Epstein from Mar-a-Lago, long before becoming president. I have seen nothing that would suggest anything improper or even questionable by Mr. Trump.

    It is clear from the evidence that Epstein committed suicide. What isn’t clear is whether he was assisted by jail personnel. That seems likely to me, based on the evidence of allegedly broken cameras, transfer of his cellmate and the absence of guards during relevant time periods.

    I have absolutely no doubt that Epstein never worked for any intelligence agency. If he had, he would surely have told me and his other lawyers, who would have used that information to get him a better deal. (He wasn’t satisfied with the so-called sweetheart deal he got, which required him to spend 1½ years in a local jail and register as a sex offender.) My sources in Israel have confirmed to me that he had no connection to Israeli intelligence. That false story—recently peddled by Tucker Carlson—probably emanated from credible allegations that Robert Maxwell (1923-91), father of Epstein’s former girlfriend, Ghislaine Maxwell, worked with the Mossad.

    Conspiracy stories attract readers, viewers and listeners. They are also fodder for political attacks. The Epstein case has generated more than its share of such theories, and there is nothing more annoying to gossip mongers than when stubborn facts (or the absence of facts) get in the way of a juicy theory. Sorry to disappoint you, but there is really nothing much to see here, beyond what has already been disclosed.

    Bill Vallicella

    5 responses to “Epstein and Trump: Nothing to See Here”

  • Hegel, Booze, and Fruit

    A Substack quickie.

    Bill Vallicella

  • The Philosopher

    A philosopher is one sensitive to the strangeness of the ordinary, and open to the puzzles hidden in platitudes. 

    Bill Vallicella

  • Is A.I. Killing the World Wide Web?

    From The Economist:

    As AI changes how people browse, it is altering the economic bargain at the heart of the internet. Human traffic has long been monetised using online advertising; now that traffic is drying up. Content producers are urgently trying to find new ways to make AI companies pay them for information. If they cannot, the open web may evolve into something very different.

    [. . .]

    “The nature of the internet has completely changed,” says Prashanth Chandrasekar, chief executive of Stack Overflow, best known as an online forum for coders. “AI is basically choking off traffic to most content sites,” he says. With fewer visitors, Stack Overflow is seeing fewer questions posted on its message boards. Wikipedia, also powered by enthusiasts, warns that AI-generated summaries without attribution “block pathways for people to access…and contribute to” the site.

    This won't affect me. My writing is a labor of love. I don't try to make money from it. I don't need to. I've made mine. You could call me a "made man." I may, however, monetize my Substack. It seems churlish to refuse the pledges that readers have kindly made.

    Bill Vallicella

    2 responses to “Is A.I. Killing the World Wide Web?”

  • Against Verbal Inflation

    There's too damned much 'reaching out' going on. 

    A Substack protest.

    Bill Vallicella

  • Intelligence, Cognition, Hallucination, and AI: Notes on Susskind

    Herewith, a first batch of notes on Richard Susskind, How to Think About AI: A Guide for the Perplexed (Oxford 2025). I thank the multi-talented Brian Bosse for steering me toward this excellent book. Being a terminological stickler, I thought I'd begin this series of posts with some linguistic and conceptual questions.  We need to define terms, make distinctions, and identify fallacies.  I use double quotation marks to quote, and single to mention, sneer, and indicate semantic extensions. Material within brackets is my interpolation. I begin with a fallacy that I myself have fallen victim to. 

    The AI Fallacy: "the mistaken assumption that the only way to get machines to perform at the level of the best humans is somehow to replicate the way humans work." (54) "The error is failing to recognize that AI systems do not [or need not] mimic or replicate human reasoning."  The preceding sentence is true, but only if the bracketed material is added.

    Intellectual honesty demands that I tax myself with having committed the AI Fallacy. I wrote:

    The verbal and non-verbal behavior of AI-driven robots is a mere simulation of the intelligent behavior of humans.  Artificial intelligence is simulated intelligence.

    This is true of first-generation systems only.  These systems "required human 'knowledge engineers' to mine the jewels from the heads of 'domain experts' and convert their knowledge into decision trees" . . . whereas "second-generation AI systems" mine jewels "from vast oceans of data" and "directly detect patterns, trends, and relationships in these oceans of data." (17-18, italics added)  These Gen-2 systems 'learn' from all this data "without needing to be explicitly programmed." (18)  This is called 'machine learning' because the machine itself is 'learning.' Note the 'raised eyebrows' which raise the question: Are these systems really learning?

    So what I quoted myself as saying was right when I was a student of engineering in the late '60s, early '70s, but it is outdated now. There were actually two things we didn't appreciate back then. One was the impact of the exponential, not linear, increase in the processing power of computers. If you are not familiar with the difference between linear and exponential functions, here is a brief intro.  IBM's Deep Blue in 1997 bested Gary Kasparov,  the quondam world chess champion. Grandmaster Kasparov was beaten by  exponentially fast brute force processing; no human chess player can evaluate 300 million possible moves in one second.

    The second factor is even more important for understanding today's AI systems. Back in the day it was thought that practical AI could be delivered by assembling "huge decision trees that captured the apparent lines of reasoning of human experts . . . ." (17) But that was Gen-1 thinking as I have already   explained.

    More needs to be said, but I want to move on to three other words tossed around in contemporary AI jargon.

    Are AI Systems Intelligent?

    Here is what I wrote in May:

    The verbal and non-verbal behavior of AI-driven robots is a mere simulation of the intelligent behavior of humans.  Artificial intelligence is simulated intelligence. And just as artificial flowers (made of plastic say) are not flowers, artificially intelligent beings are not intelligent. 'Artificial' in 'artificial intelligence' is an alienans adjective. 

    Perhaps you have never heard of such an adjective. 

    A very clear example of an alienans adjective is 'decoy' in 'decoy duck.' A decoy duck is not a duck even if it walks likes a duck, talks like a duck, etc., as the often mindlessly quoted old saying goes.   Why not? Because it is a piece of wood painted and tricked out to look like a duck to a duck so as to lure real ducks into the range of the hunters' shotguns.  The real ducks are the ducks that occur in nature. The hunters want to chow down on duck meat, not wood. A decoy duck is not a kind of duck any more than artificial leather is a kind of leather. Leather comes in different kinds: cow hide,  horse hide, etc., but artificial leather such as Naugahyde is not a kind of leather. Same goes for faux marble and false teeth and falsies.  Faux (false) marble is not marble. Fool's gold is not gold but pyrite or iron sulfide. And while false teeth might be functionally equivalent to real or natural teeth, they are not real or true teeth. That is why they are called false teeth.

    An artificial heart may be the functional equivalent of a healthy biologically human heart, inasmuch as it pumps blood just as well as a biologically human heart, but it is not a biologically human heart. It is artificial because artifactual, man-made, thus not natural.  I am presupposing that there is a deep difference between the natural and the artificial and that homo faber, man the maker, cannot obliterate that distinction by replacing everything natural with something artificial.

    I now admit, thanks to Susskind, that the bit about simulation quoted above commits what he calls the AI Fallacy, i.e., "the mistaken assumption that the only way to get machines to perform at the level of the best humans is somehow to replicate the way that humans work." (54) I also admit that said fallacy is a fallacy. The question for me now is whether I should retract my assertion that AI systems, since they are artificially intelligent, are not really intelligent.  Or is it logically consistent to affirm both of the following?

    a) It is a mistake to think that we can get the outcomes we want from AI systems only if we can get them to process information in the same way that we humans process information.

    and

    b) AI systems are not really intelligent.

    I think the two propositions are logically consistent, i.e., that they can both be true, and I think that in fact both are true. But in affirming (b) I am contradicting the "Godfather of AI," Geoffrey Hinton.  Yikes! He maintains that AI systems are all of the following: intelligent, more intelligent than us, actually conscious, potentially self-conscious, have experiences, and are the subjects of gen-u-ine volitional states. They have now or will have the ability to set goals and pursue purposes, their own purposes, whether or not they are also our purposes. If so, we might become the tools of our tools! They might have it in for us!

    Note that if AI systems are more intelligent than us, then they are intelligent in the same sense in which we are intelligent, but to a greater degree.  Now we are really, naturally, intelligent, or at least some of us are. Thus Hinton is committed to saying that artificial intelligence is identical to real intelligence, as we experience it in ourselves in the first-person way.  He thinks that advanced AI systems  understand, assess, evaluate, judge, just as we do — but they do it better!

    Now I deny that AI systems are intelligent, and I deny that they ever will be.  So I stick to my assertion that 'artificial' in 'artificial intelligence' is an alienans adjective.  But to argue my case will require deep inquiry into the nature of intelligence.  That task is on this blogger's agenda.  I suspect that Susskind will agree with my case. (Cf. pp. 59-60)  

    Cognitive Computing?

    Our natural tendency is to anthropomorphize computing machines. This is at the root of the AI Fallacy, as Susskind points out. (58)  But here I want to make a distinction between anthropocentrism and anthropomorphic projection. At the root of the AI Fallacy — the mistake of "thinking that AI systems have to copy the way humans work to achieve high-level performance" (58) — is anthropocentrism. This is what I take Susskind to mean by "anthropomorphize." We view computing machines from our point of view and think that they have to mimic, imitate, simulate what goes on in us for these machines to deliver the high-level outcomes we want.

    We engage in anthropomorphic projection when we project into the machines states of mind that we know about in the first-person way, states of mind qualitatively identical to the states of mind that we encounter in ourselves, states of mind that I claim AI systems cannot possess.  The might be what Hinton and the boys are doing. I think that Susskind might well agree with me about this. He says the following about the much bandied-about phrase 'cognitive computing':

    It might have felt cutting-edge to use this term, but it was plainly wrong-headed: the systems under this heading had no more cognitive states than a grilled kipper. It was also misleading — hype, essentially — because 'cognitive computing' suggested capabilities that AI systems did not have. (59)

    The first sentence in this quotation is bad English. What our man should have written is: "the systems under this heading no more had cognitive states than a grilled kipper." By the way, this grammatic howler illustrates how word order, and thus syntax, can affect semantics.  What Susskind wrote is false since it implies that the kipper had cognitive states. My corrected sentence is true.

    Pedantry aside, the point is that computers don't know anything. They are never in cognitive states. So say I, and I think Susskind is inclined to agree. Of course, I will have to argue this out.

    Do AI Systems Hallucinate?

    More 'slop talk' from  the AI boys, as Susskind clearly appreciates:

    The same goes for 'hallucinations', a term which is widely used to refer to the errors and fabrications to which generative AI systems are prone. At best, this is another metaphor, and at worst the word suggests cognitive states that are quite absent. Hallucinations are mistaken perceptions of sensory experiences. This really isn't what's going on when ChatGPT churns out gobbledygook. (59, italics added)

    I agree, except for the sentence I set in italics. There is nothing wrong with the grammar of the sentence. But the formulation is philosophically lame. I would put it like this, "An hallucination is an object-directed experience, the object of which  does not exist." For example, the proverbial drunk who visually hallucinates a pink rat is living through an occurrent sensory mental state that is directed upon a nonexistent object.  He cannot be mistaken about his inner perception of his sensory state; what he is mistaken about is the existence in the external world of the intentional object of his sensory state.

    There is also the question whether all hallucinations are sensory. I don't think so. Later. It's time for lunch.

    Quibbles aside, Susskind's book is excellent, inexpensive, and required reading if you are serious about these weighty questions.

    Bill Vallicella

    25 responses to “Intelligence, Cognition, Hallucination, and AI: Notes on Susskind”

  • Another Transparently Worthless Argument that Justifies the Questioning of Motives

    From my Facebook page, three years ago, today.
     
    Dick Durbin (D-IL): “I’m going to take you back in history for a moment. When that Second Amendment was written, we were talking about the likelihood a person could purchase a muzzle-loading musket.” The implied conclusion, of course, is that the Second Amendment does not protect the right of a citizen to own a semi-automatic rifle such as an AR-15.
     
    If Durbin's argument were any good, then, by parity of reasoning, the free speech clause of the First Amendment would not protect speech transmitted by telegraphy, telephony, radio, any RF device, television, e-mail, text message, you get the picture. But of course no one in his right mind who upholds the right of free speech could conceivably restrict its exercise to such media as were available at the time of the Founders.
     
    So Durbin's argument is worthless. You tell me what his motive is in giving such a specious argument. Let's be charitable and assume that he is not just plain stupid.  
     
    I go deeper into this topic over at Substack  in Geraldo Rivera and the Musket Canard.  
    Bill Vallicella

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