Category: Death and Immortality
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A Death Paradox
The prospect of death, especially one's own, puts paid to frivolity. It makes us serious. The paradox, however, is that death, ineluctable and final, 'proves' the absurdity of human existence. Death imparts seriousness to a life that it also suggests is a joke.
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Presentism and Bodily Resurrection
Are presentism and bodily resurrection logically compatible? Edward Buckner wonders about this. He got me wondering about it. So let me take a stab at sorting it out. The Resurrection of the Body I will assume the traditional doctrine of the resurrection according to which (i) resurrection is resurrection of the (human) body, and (ii)…
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Has Benatar Refuted the Epicurean Argument?
This is the tenth installment in a series on David Benatar's The Human Predicament (Oxford UP, 2017). We are still in the very rich Chapter 5, "Death." Herewith, commentary on pp. 123-128. My answer to the title question is No, but our author has very effectively shown that the Epicurean argument is not compelling, and perhaps even that it is…
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Ashes to Ashes; Dust to Dust
"Remember, man, thou art dust and unto dust thou shalt return." Memento, homo, quia pulvis es et in pulverem reverteris. This warning, from the Catholic liturgy for Ash Wednesday, is based on Genesis 3, 19: In sudore vultus tui vesceris pane, donec revertaris in terram de qua sumptus es: quia pulvis es et in pulverem reverteris. How real can we…
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Benatar on the Lucretian Symmetry Argument
This is the ninth installment in a series on David Benatar's The Human Predicament (Oxford UP, 2017). We now take up the Lucretian symmetry argument insofar as it bears upon the question whether being dead is bad. That is what Benatar maintains. Being dead is bad for the one who is dead even though to be dead is to be…
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The Uselessness of Stoicism in the Face of Death
Josef Pieper, Death and Immortality (Herder and Herder, 1969), p.101: But the profound discord and hidden infirmity, with which the Stoic doctrine was already infected at its root in classical times, is nowhere revealed so baldly as in its attitude toward death. There is nothing surprising about this. The maxim not to let our hearts…
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Strange Anti-Epicurean Bedfellows: Josef Pieper, Thomist and David Benatar, Anti-Natalist
Many find the Epicurean reasoning about death sophistical. Among those who do, we encounter some strange bedfellows. To compress the famous reasoning into a trio of sentences: When we are, death is not. When death is, we are not. Therefore, death is nothing to us, and nothing to fear. The distinguished German Thomist, Josef Pieper,…
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Presentism and the Existence Requirement
Why do some find the Existence Requirement self-evident? Could it be because of a (tacit) commitment to presentism? Here again is the Existence Requirement: (ER) In order for something to be bad for somebody, that person must exist at the time it is bad for him. (D. Benatar, The Human Predicament, 111,115) Assuming mortalism, after…
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Benatar on Annihilation and the Existence Requirement
Herewith, the eighth installment in a series on David Benatar's The Human Predicament (Oxford UP, 2017). We are still in the juicy and technically rich Chapter 5 entitled "Death." This entry covers pp. 102-118. People who dismiss this book unread are missing out on a lot of good philosophy. You are no philosopher if you refuse to examine arguments the…
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Death, Deprivation, and Property-Possession
Vlastimil asks, "In which sense exactly IS it bad FOR the young person to BE deprived AT the time he NO longer exists? It's a nice sentence to say but I just don't know what it is supposed to mean." We are assuming mortalism, the view that the body's death is the death of the…
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On Taking Pleasure in the Death of Enemies
Is it Schadenfreude to take pleasure in the death of an enemy? Only if it is bad to be dead. But it is not clear that it is bad to be dead. On the other hand, if it is bad to be dead, it might still not be Schadenfreude to take pleasure in the death…
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Benatar, Death, and Deprivation
This is the seventh entry in a series on David Benatar's The Human Predicament (Oxford UP, 2017). We are still in Chapter 5 and will be here for some time. This entry covers pp. 98-102. Recall the Issue If one is a mortalist, but also holds that human life is objectively bad, then one might naturally view death as…
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David Benatar on Death and the Challenge of the Epicurean Argument in its Hedonist Form
This is the sixth in a series on David Benatar's The Human Predicament (Oxford UP, 2017). We are now in Chapter 5. I will need to proceed slowly through this rich and detailed chapter. There is a lot to learn from it. The entry covers pp. 92-101. Does Death Release Us From the Human Predicament? Logically prior questions: Is…
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Mary Neal’s Out-of-Body Experiences: Do They Prove Anything?
A repost from 16 December 2012 with minor edits. ……………………………………….. The personable Dr. Neal recounts her experiences during this 13 and a half minute video clip. The following from an interview with her: The easy explanations—dreams or hallucinations—I could discount quickly, because my experience—and the experience described by anyone who's had a near death experience or other experiences that…
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Is a Thinking Person’s Afterlife Conceivable?
A repost from over five years ago. Reposts are the reruns of the blogosphere. You don't watch a Twilight Zone or Seinfeld episode only once, do you? No you don't. The savoring of the riches therein contained requires many viewings. Same with what follows, mutatis mutandis. Resurrected due to its relevance to a recent thread…