Category: Constituent Ontology
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Hylomorphic Ontological Analysis and the Puzzle of Prime Matter
Recent posts have discussed hylomorphic dualism in the philosophy of mind. It is a serious contender in the arena of competing positions — unlike say, eliminative materialism, which is not. (If you think I'm just gassing off about EM, read the entries in the eponymous category.) But now I want to take a step back from…
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Feser Defends Hylomorphic Dualism Against My Criticism
I want to thank Edward Feser for responding to my recent post, A Problem for the Hylomorphic Dualist. And while you are at Ed's site, please read his outstanding entry, So you think you understand the cosmological argument?, an entry with which I agree entirely. Ed writes, Naturally, since I am a hylemorphic dualist, I…
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How Are Form and Matter Related in Compound Material Substances?
Favoring as I do constituent ontology, I am sympathetic to that type of constituent ontology which is hylomorphic ontological analysis, as practiced by Aristotelians, Thomists, et al. The obscurity of such fundamental concepts as form, matter, act, potency, substance, and others is, however, troubling. Let's see if we can make sense of the relation between form…
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The Problem of Individuation: Genuine or Pseudo?
1. The ontological problem of individuation is actually two problems. One is the problem of what makes two or more numerically different individuals numerically different. What grounds numerical difference? The other is the problem of what makes an individual an individual as opposed to a member of some other category of entity. What grounds individuality? …
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Is the Difference Between a Fact and Its Constituents a Brute Difference?
Note to Steven Nemes: Tell me if you find this totally clear, and if not, point out what is unclear. Tell me whether you accept my overall argument. The day before yesterday in conversation Steven Nemes presented a challenge I am not sure I can meet. I have maintained (in my book, in published articles,…
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How Prevent a Proliferation of Modes of Being?
An astute reader comments: Allowing for multiple modes of being may lead to too many or infinitely many modes. Using your own example and oversimplifying on purpose: if the mode of being of the house made of bricks is different from that of the bricks, what prevents us from claiming that there are different modes…
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In Defense of Modes of Being: Substance and Accident
The 'thin' conception of being or existence, lately explained, entails that there are no modes of being. Most analytic philosophers accept the thin conception and reject modes of being. Flying in the face of analytic orthodoxy, I maintain that the modes-of-being doctrine is defensible. Indeed, I should like to say something stronger, namely, that it…
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An Argument for Mental Acts
An earlier post explains the distinction between mental acts and mental actions. But a logically prior question is whether there are any mental acts in the first place. Suppose I hear the characteristic rumble of a Harley-Davidson engine and then suddenly think of Peter. One cannot move straightaway from such a commonplace observation recorded in ordinary English…
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The Bundle Theory and the Identity of Indiscernibles
I have been defending the bundle-of-universals theory of concrete particulars (BT) against various weak objections over a series of posts, here, here, here, and here. Now I consider a very powerful objection, one that many will consider decisive. The objection can be cast in the mold of modus tollendo tollens: If BT is true, then…
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Bundling is Symmetrical But not Transitive
Over the phone the other day, Peter L. suggested the following objection to the bundle-of-universals theory of ordinary particulars, 'BT' hereafter. (I leave out of consideration for the nonce bundle-of-tropes bundle theories.) I am not sure I understood what Peter was driving at. But here is the gist of what I thought he was saying. 1.…
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Can a Bundle Theory Accommodate Change?
0. Peter L. has been peppering me with objections to bundle theories. This post considers the objection from change. 1. Distinguish existential change (coming into being and passing out of being) from alterational change, or alteration. Let us think about ordinary meso-particulars such as avocados and coffee cups. If an avocado is unripe on Monday but…
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Two Questions About the Bundle Theory Answered
On the bundle-of-universals theory of ordinary concrete particulars, such a particular is a bundle of its properties and its properties are universals. This theory will appeal to those who, for various ontological and epistemological reasons, resist substratum theories and think of properties as universals. Empiricists like Bertrand Russell, for example. Powerful objections can be brought…
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Metaphysics at Cindy’s: The Ontological Stucture of Contingent Conreta
Over Sunday breakfast at Cindy's, a hardscrabble Mesa, Arizona eatery not unwelcoming to metaphysicians and motorcyclists alike, Peter Lupu fired a double-barreled objection at my solution to Deck's Paradox. The target, however, was not hit. My solution requires that (a) concrete particulars can be coherently 'assayed' (to use a favorite word of Gustav Bergmann), or given an…
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Ontological Analysis in Aristotle and Bergmann: Prime Matter Versus Bare Particulars
Hardly anyone reads Gustav Bergmann any more, but since I read everything, I read Bergmann. It is interesting to compare his style of ontological analysis with that of the great hylomorphic ontologists, Aristotle and Aquinas. The distinguished Aristotelian Henry B. Veatch does some of my work for me in a fine paper, "To Gustav Bergmann: A…
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Christology, Reduplicatives, and Their Truth-Makers
Consider this triad, and whether it is logically consistent: 1. The man Jesus = the 2nd Person of the Trinity.2. The 2nd Person of the Trinity exists necessarily.3. The man Jesus does not exist necessarily. Each of these propositions is one that a Christian who understands his doctrine ought to accept. But how can they…