Maverick Philosopher

Footnotes to Plato from the foothills of the Superstition Mountains

Category: Belief

  • Be Glad there is no Physiognomy of Belief

    If the faces of people were as radically different as their beliefs, how few of our fellows would we recognize as human!

  • The Complacency of Unbelief

    Doubt is to be deployed against the complacency of unbelief as much as against the complacency of belief. A vital faith is never entirely free of purifying doubt which in some persons, at some times, extends to the brink of despair. Christ on the cross experienced the deepest depth of Incarnation in the feeling of…

  • Doxastic Conservatism

    The onus probandi is on the extremist in matters of belief.  Extreme beliefs bear the burden of proof.  There is a defeasible presumption in favor of moderate views just as there is a defeasible presumption in favor of traditional ways of doing things.  Note the qualifier, 'defeasible.' Related articles Happiness Maxims (2013 Version) The Zimmerman…

  • Not Enough Evidence?

     "Not enough evidence, God, not enough evidence!" (Bertrand Russell) It may well be that our predicament is such as to disallow conclusive or even sufficient evidence of the truth about it. If Plato's Cave Allegory is apt, if it lays bare the truth of the human predicament, then it must be that the evidence that…

  • Underbelief

    Much of religion is overbelief, but much of science is underbelief.  One sees less than is there; one sees only what one's restricted method allows one to see.  Examples are legion.  Find them. For more on overbelief and underbelief, see the first two articles below. Related articles Unusual Experiences and the Problem of Overbelief and…

  • Cognitive Dissonance or Doxastic Dissonance?

    From what appears to be a reputable source: Cognitive Dissonance Theory, developed by Leon Festinger (1957), is concerned with the relationships among cognitions. A cognition, for the purpose of this theory, may be thought of as a ³piece of knowledge.² The knowledge may be about an attitude, an emotion, a behavior, a value, and so…

  • The Politics of Impassibility

    This just over the transom:   I hope you don’t mind my seeking your help on an issue related to the history of philosophy. I and a few friends are have a disagreement re: the origin of belief in divine apatheia.   In Manana: Christian Theology from a Hispanic Perspective, Justo Gonzalez discusses the political motivations behind…

  • Knowledge, Belief, Action: Three Maxims

    1. Don't claim to know what you merely believe even on good evidence. 2. Don't claim to believe what you are not prepared to act upon. 3. Don't let insufficient evidence prevent you from believing what you are better off believing in the long run than not believing in the long run. Related articles Knowledge and…

  • In the Absence of Knowledge, May One Believe? Remarks on Magee

    According to Bryan Magee ("What I Believe," Philosophy 77 (2002), 407- 419), nobody knows the answers to such questions as whether we survive our bodily deaths or whether God exists. Citing Xenophanes and Kant, Magee further suggests that the answers to these questions are not only unknown but impossible for us to know. Assuming that…

  • Nine Impediments to Religious Belief

    Why is religious belief so hard to accept?  Herewith, some notes toward a list of the impedimenta, the stumbling blocks, that litter and lie in the path of the would-be believer.  Whether the following ought to be impediments is a further question,  a normative question.  The following taxonomy is merely descriptive.  And not in order of stopping power.  And…

  • Overbelief and Romans 1: 18-20

    I met with S. N. in Tempe yesterday for philosophy and chess. While we were talking about overbelief, it occurred to me that Romans 1: 18-20 is another good example of overbelief.  Now there is an issue that the budding theologian S. N. made me aware of, an issue that the philosopher in me desires…

  • Unusual Experiences and the Problem of Overbelief and Underbelief

    One day, well over 30 years ago, I was deeply tormented by a swarm of negative thoughts and feelings that had arisen because of a dispute with a certain person.  Pacing around my apartment, I suddenly, without any forethought, raised my hands toward the ceiling and said, "Release me!"  It was a wholly spontaneous cri du coeur,…

  • More on Knowledge and Belief

    Here is yesterday's aporetic triad: 1. Knowledge entails belief. 2. Belief is essentially tied to action. 3. There are items of knowledge that are not essentially tied to action. Daniel K comments and I respond in blue: First, as to your aporetic triad: I would like to reject (3) in one sense that I describe…

  • Knowledge and Belief: An Aporetic Triad

    Here is a trio of propositions that are jointly inconsistent but individually plausible: 1. Knowledge entails belief. 2. Belief is essentially tied to action. 3. There are items of knowledge that are not essentially tied to action. Clearly, any two of these propositions is logically inconsistent with the remaining one.  Thus the conjunction of (1)…

  • Hodges on Vallicella on Harris versus Atran on Islamist Beliefs and Practices

    Here.  Scott Atran enters the ComBox.