Footnotes to Plato from the foothills of the Superstition Mountains

Category: Belief

  • Kripke, Belief, Irrationality, and Contradiction

    London Ed comments: I also note a confusion that has been running through this discussion, about the meaning of ‘contradiction’. I do not mean to appeal to etymology or authority, but it’s important we agree on what we mean by it. On my understanding, a contradiction is not ‘the tallest girl in the class is…

  • What Exactly is Kripke’s Puzzle About Belief?

    I will try to explain it as clearly and succinctly as I can.  I will explain the simplest version of the puzzle, the 'monoglot' version.  We shall cleave to English as to our dear mother. The puzzle is generated by the collision of two principles, one concerning reference, the other concerning disquotation.  Call them MILL…

  • Background for a Discussion of Kripke’s “A Puzzle About Belief”

    London Ed wants to discuss the Paderewski example in Saul Kripke's  "A Puzzle About Belief."  But before doing so we should see if we agree on some preliminary points.  Knowing Ed, he will probably find a way to disagree with a good chunk what I am about to say.  So I expect we will get…

  • Do Christians and Muslims Believe in the Same God? Francis Beckwith and the Kalam Cosmological Argument

    Francis Beckwith mentions the Kalam Cosmological Argument in his latest The Catholic Thing article (7 January 2106): 1. Whatever begins to exist has a cause. 2. The universe began to exist. 3. Therefore, the universe has a cause of its existence. Suppose that a Muslim and Christian come to believe that God exists on the basis…

  • Doubt and Belief

    Doubting no more confers dubitability upon that which is doubted than believing confers credibility upon that which is believed.

  • Evidence and Actuality: A Modal Punch at W. K. Clifford

    W. K. Clifford is often quoted for his asseveration that "it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence."  Now one of my firmest beliefs is that I am an actual individual, not a merely possible individual. A second is my belief that while there is an infinity of possible…

  • On Indoctrination

    Is indoctrination ever a good thing? Presumably, to indoctrinate is to teach one doctrine as if it is true, as opposed to presenting a variety of different doctrines on the same topic without endorsing any one of them.  In general, indoctrination ought not be done at the college level: Competing positions should be presented fairly and objectively and students…

  • Life Without Views

    Could one live well without views, 'long' views?  I address the question in Long Views and Short Views: Is Shorter Better?

  • Decision and Conclusion

    How much of decision is included in every conclusion?  Did you conclude that there is no God or decide that there is no God?  Some of both?  Which then is the major player here, reason or will?

  • Dolezal, Knowledge, and Belief

    R. C. writes, I hadn't heard of the Dolezal case until reading your blog post. It occurred to me that this case might serve as a counterexample to the standard epistemological position that belief is necessary for knowledge. I don't know Dolezal's psychological/epistemic state. But suppose she knows that she isn't African-American by race, but…

  • Do You Think Your Views Will Ever Change?

    The question was put to atheist A. C. Grayling. His response: No, my views will not change; I am confident in the rationalist tradition which has evaluated the metaphysical and ethical claims of non-naturalistic theories, and definitively shown them to be vacuous in all respects other than the psychological effect they have on those credulous…

  • Plantinga Reviews Philip Kitcher, Life After Faith: The Case for Secular Humanism

    Here. The wild diversity of religious doctrines suggests to Kitcher that they are all almost certainly false.  Plantinga makes an interesting response: But even for whole systems: there is certainly wide variety here, but how does it follow that they are all almost certainly false? Or even that any particular one is almost false? Kitcher's…

  • Against Historical Relativism: Adorno on What is No Longer Believable After Auschwitz

    Theodor Wiesengrund Adorno is exasperating but exciting. Although as sloppy as one expects Continental thinkers to be, he is nonetheless a force to be reckoned with, a serious man who is seriously grappling with ultimates at the outer limits of intelligibility. Derrida I dismiss as a bullshitter; indeed, to cop a line from John Searle,…

  • Doubting and Believing

    Doubting no more confers dubitability upon that which is doubted than believing bestows credibility upon that which is believed.

  • Why Faith?

    If we need truth we cannot know, then we need faith.