"Equality, I spoke the word as if a wedding vow; ah, but I was so much older then, I'm younger than that now."
Bob Dylan, My Back Pages
Reader Jacques spots an error of mine in a recent entry and goes on to make points with which I agree:
In your recent post on "sloppy liberal thinking about equality" you seem to be thinking a little sloppily yourself. (No offense! I admire your philosophical writing and I've learned a lot from your blog.)
You say that equality of opportunity is necessary but not sufficient for equality of outcomes, but in fact it's neither sufficient nor necessary. It is clearly possible to have unequal opportunities, in pretty much any sense that we can give to that term, and equal outcomes. In fact the denial of equal opportunity might often be necessary for equal outcomes. If many As are criminals and very few Bs are, the only way to equalize the outcomes for As and Bs with respect to incarceration (for example) will be to deny them equal opportunities. Maybe we give Bs many more opportunities to shape up than we give to As, for example. Or maybe we sentence As more harshly than Bs for the same offences.
Or imagine a more extreme scenario: all As but no Bs are competent philosophers. Universities might then arrange to have 'equal outcomes' for As and Bs with respect to admission to graduate studies in philosophy only by making their 'opportunities' grossly unequal in relevant respects. For example, they might choose to set absurdly high standards for any A who seeks admission to a graduate program while setting absurdly low standards for any B, thus ensuring that exactly equal numbers of As and Bs are admitted. Or they might choose to introduce new criteria for admission which have no systematic relationship to anyone's interest or ability in philosophy, but which can be expected to be met by most Bs and only a few As. (Perhaps almost all Bs are left-handed or good at Scrabble, and these traits are very rare among As. The universities declare that being a left-handed Scrabble player contributes something vital and deep and vibrant to the philosophical culture, and that, therefore, those who can enrich the culture in this respect, just by being who they are, and that, therefore, they should always be preferred to other candidates in relation to whom they are 'relatively equal' in other respects.)
Of course, this is pretty much how 'equal outcomes' are achieved, or approximated, in our actual society under the rule of Leftism. Since people and groups are in fact radically unequal in their abilities and interests and in pretty much every way that matters, the desired equality of outcomes must always be achieved by denying opportunities to some people and creating special opportunities for others. This is how 'affirmative action' works, for example. If the relevant 'opportunities' were really equal, there would be far fewer women and racial minorities in philosophy than there are at present. And usually it's quite obvious that women, for example, are being hired or promoted on the basis of qualifications or achievements that would not count for much if they were men. (Not to suggest, of course, that no or few women are capable or competent philosophers; the point is that if they are their capabilities and competence are almost always rated far more highly than they would be if they were men.) Women and minorities are routinely given a kind of 'opportunity' that is denied to others: the opportunity to have their achievements and abilities assessed under less demanding standards.